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INTRODUCTION
Administrative enforcement, especially the use of large civil penalties, is on the upswing. In recent years, administrative
agencies have imposed historically large civil penalties on an
agency-by-agency basis. In January 2014, as part of the resolu† Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor of Law and Karelitz
Chair in Evidence and Procedure, University of New Mexico School of Law. Email: minzner@law.unm.edu. The author thanks Rick Bierschbach, Camille
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tion of the Madoff scandal, J.P. Morgan Chase paid $461 million to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, a record for
1
that agency. In June 2012, Barclays Bank agreed to pay a $200
million civil penalty to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) for interest rate manipulation, the largest pen2
alty imposed in CFTC history. Just weeks before, the Office of
Foreign Asset Control of the Department of Treasury imposed a
record $619 million dollar penalty on ING Bank in connection
with a joint investigation with the Department of Justice relat3
ing to transactions with Cuban and Iranian clients. Another
branch of the Department of Treasury, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, levied its largest penalty in its history in
December 2012, a $500 million dollar sanction against HSBC
4
Bank for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act.
The frequency of these cases is striking. The dollar figures
are big and the number of cases large, but the breadth of agencies involved is equally significant. We see many different
agencies bringing enforcement actions. This is the result of a
key structural choice in federal civil enforcement. In general, at
the federal level, regulatory enforcement is decentralized and
spread across specialist agencies. Enforcement power is delegated to a range of administrative agencies with subject matter
expertise. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Office of Foreign Asset Control (among many others) all have enforcement arms fo-

1. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2014-1 (Dep’t of Treasury Jan.
7, 2014) (assessing civil penalty), available at http://www.fincen.gov/
news_room/ea/files/JPMorgan_ASSESSMENT_01072014.pdf. The payment
was part of a broader global settlement with the Department of Justice and
other regulators. See Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan Settles Its Madoff Tab,
WALL
ST .
J.
(Jan.
7,
2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304887104579306323011059460.
2. See CFTC Orders Barclays To Pay $200 Million Penalty for Attempted
Manipulation of and False Reporting Concerning LIBOR and Euribor Benchmark Interest Rates, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURE TRADING COMMISSION (June
27, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6289-12; see also
Barclays To Pay Largest Fine in CFTC History, CBS NEWS (June 27, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/barclays-to-pay-largest-civil-fine-in-cftc
-history.
3. ING Bank N.V. Agrees To Forfeit $619 Million for Illegal Transactions
with Cuban and Iranian Entities, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST. (June 12, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-742.html.
4. OCC Assesses $500 Million Civil Money Penalty Against HSBC Bank
USA, N.A., U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www2.occ.gov/
news-issuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-173.html.
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5

cused on the agency’s regulatory subject matter.
Why structure enforcement this way, with the power to
bring cases divided among many agencies focused on different
industries? The standard answer is that we assume expert
agencies are the entities best suited to enforce in their regulatory domains. Agencies draft the regulations and are staffed
with industry experts. Academics, judges, and Congress see enforcement as deeply entangled with the agency’s other missions. Expertise in enforcement follows from the agency’s other
capacities. We assume that subject matter expertise will ensure
the appropriate enforcement of statutes. Because, for example,
the SEC has specialized knowledge about the securities industry, the standard view is this expertise gives it the ability to
identify and investigate the right violations, bring the correct
enforcement actions, and extract the appropriate penalties.
This assumed superiority of specialized enforcement has
gone largely unexamined. This silence is rather surprising, because criminal enforcement has taken a very different approach. Federal criminal enforcement is centralized in a generalist agency. The DOJ retains a monopoly on criminal
prosecutions regardless of the substantive area regulated by
the statute. Cases ranging from narcotics and violent crime to
criminal antitrust and securities fraud are charged, litigated,
6
and settled by a single unified agency. Furthermore, the DOJ
is charged with enforcement as its central mission, largely to
7
the exclusion of other tasks. Unlike regulatory agencies, DOJ
5. See 2015 OFAC Recent Actions, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/OFAC
-Recent-Actions.aspx (last updated Feb. 17, 2015); Division of Enforcement,
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/enforce (last modified
Mar. 18, 2014); Enforcement, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/lawregulation/enforcement/index.htm (last
visited Apr. 20, 2015); Enforcement, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION, http://
www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement.html (last updated Oct. 20,
2014).
6. See, e.g., U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Criminal Division,
U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST., http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/criminal.html (last
visited Apr. 20, 2015). United States Attorney’s Offices, the primary litigating
units of the Department of Justice, are geographically decentralized, which
can lead to subject-matter specialization. For instance, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York has a particular expertise in securities cases. Despite this role that geography plays in enforcement,
enforcement policy is set and controlled centrally in the United States Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., and all of the offices have the capacity to prosecute a range of substantive crimes.
7. The Department’s mission statement reflects this focus: To enforce the
law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic; to provide federal
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neither drafts the substantive criminal statutes it enforces nor
issues interpretations of those statutes that have the force of
8
law.
This Article challenges the claim that specialization is always superior. First, I demonstrate that enforcement itself is
an area of expertise not wholly intertwined with subject matter
expertise. Part I introduces the assumption by scholars, Congress, and the judiciary that agencies will be expert in enforcement because of their specialized knowledge, but as Part II
demonstrates, core enforcement questions about how to investigate cases and which violations to charge are frequently independent of the substantive regulatory area. Agencies that make
these decisions well are apt to be able to do so in different areas
of law. As a result, the value of specialized knowledge about an
industry trades off against specialized knowledge about enforcement.
Part III explores the structural consequences of specialization. In addition to costs and benefits based on knowledge, specialized enforcement brings structural strengths and weaknesses. Part III initially outlines two challenges faced by
specialized enforcers that generalist agencies are more likely to
avoid. First, specialists are more vulnerable to political pressure. In ordinary times, regulatory capture can produce
underenforcement. Following major enforcement failures,
though, the political salience of enforcement switches and
overenforcement can result. Second, specialized enforcement
inevitably suffers from a silo effect. The agency can only control
the direct consequences of its own enforcement action, while
the enforcement target considers all of the potential effects.
These collateral effects include the possibility of subsequent
civil litigation and enforcement actions by other regulators.
This silo effect distorts the outcomes of specialized enforcement.
These weaknesses have countervailing benefits. A central
goal of any enforcement regime is norm reinforcement—
agencies want to build norms of compliance within firms. Agencies that are closer to the substantive regulatory area are betleadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for
those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans. About DOJ, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/about/about.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
8. For an argument in favor of an alternative approach, see Dan M.
Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469,
488–92 (1996) (arguing for a delegation of interpretive power to the Department of Justice).
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ter situated to learn these norms and help them develop. Specialist enforcement agencies also have more options than generalists. Within the structure of specialized agencies, enforcement authorities are under the supervision of the rule-making
authority. As a result, agencies have a choice of mechanisms to
alter the behavior of regulated entities. They can change the
substantive rule or bring an enforcement action.
These costs and benefits mean that specialist enforcement
is likely to be superior in some cases but not in others. In particular, Part IV argues that we need to approach specialized enforcement carefully. First, Congress now follows a default rule.
New regulatory agencies, like the Consumer Finance Protection
Bureau, get civil enforcement authority as part of their statutory authorization with little thought. A careful tradeoff of the
costs and benefits, though, suggest that agency enforcement
should only be specialized so far. For some agencies, like the
SEC and the CFTC, a merger of the enforcement arms might
produce significant returns. Second, the judicial branch needs
to think about comparative deference. The judiciary strongly
defers to agency enforcement choices based on an assumption of
expertise. The costs and benefits of specialization, though, suggest that deference should be weaker as agencies become more
specialized. Finally, agencies themselves need to closely coordinate their enforcement efforts, both in individual cases and at
the level of policy, in order to allow the strengths of specialized
enforcement to show through while overcoming its weaknesses.
I. THE STRUCTURAL CHOICE OF AGENCY
ENFORCEMENT
Agency structure affects regulatory outcomes. This basic
9
concept has a long pedigree in the political science literature
and is now widely recognized in the legal literature as well.
Scholars have started to consider the questions of the size and
scope of agencies, whether authority should be centralized or
decentralized, and the costs and benefits of overlapping agency
10
authority. The enforcement function is no exception. How ad9. See, e.g., Steven J. Balla, Administrative Procedures and Political
Control of the Bureaucracy, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 663, 664 (1998); Matthew D.
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of
Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 481 (1989); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll
& Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures As Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 273–74 (1987).
10. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (2012); Anne Joseph
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ministrative agency enforcement should be structured is beginning to receive considerable academic attention.
A key debate has focused on who should enforce. How
many enforcers should be given the responsibility for policing
and preventing violations? One option is centralized enforcement. A single administrative agency, such as the SEC, can be
given an enforcement monopoly, and alternative enforcers,
such as private class action lawyers, can be excluded. Alternatively, enforcement might be decentralized. Multiple federal enforcers could have the authority to bring enforcement actions.
State enforcers, such as Attorneys General and private class
action attorneys, can join and supplement the enforcement ef11
fort.
These arguments typically focus on the relative risk of
overenforcement and underenforcement. Advocates of centralization, starting with Professor William Landes and Richard
Posner, emphasize the problems of overenforcement and
12
overdeterrence. In a world of decentralized enforcement, regulatory targets face the possibility of repetitive investigations,
either simultaneous or sequential, seeking to punish the same
violation. Multiple enforcement actions by state or federal regulators (or a private class action following a public enforcement
action) will produce multiple sanctions. Without careful coordination, these multiple sanctions might well exceed the optimal
level of punishment for a given violation. In this way, decentralization can produce overpunishment and overdeterrence.
Centralizing enforcement in a single federal administrative
agency prevents this outcome.
On the other hand, decentralization advocates emphasize
the mechanism of regulatory capture. Regulated entities, of
course, often work to influence and gain control over their regulator. In the enforcement arena, this pressure from capture
pushes public enforcers in the direction of less enforcement. If
O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing
Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1674 (2006).
11. Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 698, 699–704 (2011); Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National
Policy: A Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97
MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1366 (2013).
12. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15–16 (1975). For more recent discussions, see
James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and Competition To Enforce the Securities
Laws, 100 CAL. L. REV. 115, 121–22 (2012) (describing the relevant literature
on competitive enforcement and over and underdeterrence), and Amanda M.
Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical
Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2200–03 (2010).

2015]

SHOULD AGENCIES ENFORCE?

2119

enforcement is centralized in a single federal agency, capture
can produce underenforcement and underdeterrence. Additional enforcers can counteract capture by bringing their resources
13
to bear and competing with the primary public enforcer. Decentralization thus allows other entities to supplement the en14
forcement efforts of the primary administrative agency.
Notice what is missing from this debate—the possibility
that federal agencies should not enforce at all. Even scholars
recognizing
the
complexity
of
the
centralization/decentralization debate tend to assume that a specialized
15
federal enforcer is inevitable. The right model may be one
where enforcement authority is consolidated in a single enforcer but one that specializes in enforcement itself to the exclusion
of other tasks. Rather than spread enforcement authority
across multiple potential actors, or combine enforcement goals
with other agency goals, we should consider a third option. An
agency that treats enforcement as its primary and exclusive
task should be viewed a viable structural choice.
Perhaps the absence of this option in the literature should
not be a surprise. When setting out the doctrines that govern
administrative enforcement, Congress and the Supreme Court
have repeatedly started with a key assumption that has shaped
the law. Both the legislature and the judicial branch assume
that agencies will be expert in enforcement because they are
expert in their statutes, their industries, and their regulatory
scheme. This belief has heavily influenced both the initial Congressional authorization of agency enforcement and the subsequent judicial review of its use.
At the front end, Congress makes the first choice. It decides whether to grant agencies the power to enforce the statutes they administer. Most famously, it seriously considered
the question of whether to give the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforcement authority. As initially
structured, the EEOC lacked the ability to bring enforcement
16
actions. As part of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
13. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 58 (2010); see also Lemos,
supra note 11, at 717–20.
14. For a recent introduction to the general debate over centralized and
decentralized enforcement, see Rose, supra note 11, at 1351–59.
15. See id. at 1359 (identifying the context-specific value of overlapping
enforcement); Park, supra note 12, at 172–78 (recognizing that value of multiple enforcers depends on the legal rule at issue).
16. See Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why The EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671, 672–74 (2005).
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1972, Congress expanded its powers and gave it the ability to
17
bring actions directly against employers.
The legislative history supported this grant of enforcement
authority largely based on the expertise of the agency in the
subject of its regulatory jurisdiction: employment discrimination. Congress authorized the agency to seek cease-and-desist
orders because of the complex nature of discrimination in indi18
vidual employment environments. Similarly, it transferred
the authority to bring pattern and practice cases from the DOJ
to the EEOC because the agency “has access to the most current statistical computations and analyses regarding employment patterns and has the most extensive expertise in dealing
19
with employment discrimination.” The EEOC’s expert understanding of discrimination was also an important basis for giv20
ing it enforcement authority over its sister federal agencies.
In addition to shaping the initial choice about design, the
response of the judicial branch to agency enforcement choices
relies on this presumed connection between agency mission and
enforcement expertise. Most significantly, the federal courts
have held that key agency enforcement choices are largely nonreviewable. This deference rests on the same assumption.
Courts see enforcement decisions as arising out of the agency’s
specialized knowledge and understanding of its regulatory system. Take, for example, the decision not to bring an enforcement action. In Heckler v. Chaney, the Court held that it would
generally not review agency decisions not to enforce since that
decision “often involves a complicated balancing of a number of
21
factors which are peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise.”
Because the Court believed that the questions relevant to the
non-enforcement decision were deeply linked to other agency
22
choices, the expertise of the agency deserved deference.
Other components of agency enforcement receive similar
17. Id. at 677; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012) (authorizing a civil action).
18. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 8 (1971) (“It is increasingly obvious that
the entire area of employment discrimination is one whose resolution requires
not only expert assistance, but also the technical perception that a problem
exists in the first place, and that the system complained of is unlawful.”).
19. Id. at 14.
20. Id. at 25 (“Because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
is the expert agency in the field of employment discrimination and because it
is an independent agency removed from the administration of Federal employment, it is the most logical place for the enforcement power to be vested.”).
21. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
22. Id. at 831–32.
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treatment for the same reason. The Supreme Court defers to
agency choices about remedies and penalties. Agency penalty
decisions receive a very deferential standard on later judicial
review because “the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a
23
matter for administrative competence.” Similarly, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
strongly defers to agency decisions to settle enforcement actions. Such “judgments—arising from considerations of resource allocation, agency priorities, and costs of alternatives—
24
are well within the agency’s expertise and discretion.” At virtually every stage of administrative enforcement, agencies have
broad and largely unconstrained authority because courts and
Congress assume that their expertise in their subject matter
and regulatory mission makes them experts in enforcing their
statutes and rules.
II. ENFORCEMENT AS A SPECIALIZATION
Are Congress and the courts correct? Does enforcement expertise follow from the other components of agency expertise?
Not always. This Part argues that many enforcement questions
are general in nature, not specialized. Regardless of the subject
matter of the action, repeated issues arise in enforcement actions. Agencies that focus on enforcement, rather than simply
have enforcement as one task of many, are likely to do better in
answering these questions.
Each Section in this Part looks at connected issues involving charging decisions and enforcement discretion. Section A
considers the choice about which potential defendants are
charged with a particular focus on corporate charging decisions.
Civil regulatory enforcers commonly need to choose whether to
charge the individuals who actually committed the violation,
the corporation where they worked, or both. Section B examines the exercise of discretion in the remedy sought once the
charging decision is made. Enforcers need to decide which cases
need a large penalty and which deserve a more modest sanction. Section C focuses on the opposite of penalties—benefits
conferred on individuals as part of the enforcement process. Enforcers must choose how to protect whistleblowers, appropriately reduce charges for cooperators involved in the violation, and
reward others who provide information.
23. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185 (1973) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 494 F.3d 1027,
1032 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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For each of these three areas, I make two points. First,
while each choice involves considering some subject-specific information, a large component of the agency’s decision is subject
matter independent. These three areas involve considerations
requiring expertise in enforcement, not just in the regulatory
subject matter. As a result, we face a tradeoff. We should expect generalist enforcers to be better at the general questions
and specialized enforcers to be better at the subject-specific
questions.
Second, successful enforcement policies in all three areas
require communication with the regulated community. Regulatory targets need to know not only what conduct will be penalized, but also to what extent. Potential witnesses need to know
what will happen to them if they come forward. As a theoretical
matter, we should expect a generalist enforcer to be better at
establishing and communicating policies on these matters. Indeed, in practice, in each area, the DOJ has clear policies in
place for handling criminal cases, while agencies frequently do
not. In each of these areas, at best, federal agencies frequently
reinvent the wheel. At worst, they never invent it in the first
place.
A. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: WHO?
Enforcers must first decide the scope of liability. This initial charging decision requires a choice about which defendants
to pursue and which defendants to ignore. As a practical matter, every enforcement agency sees more violations than it can
charge, so some potential defendants will be allowed to es25
cape. These decisions are perhaps the classic example of prosecutorial discretion by public enforcers. This choice belongs to
the enforcement agency alone. Both in the civil and criminal
26
context, decisions not to charge are effectively unreviewable.
This initial charging decision certainly has subject-specific
attributes. A common consideration in this choice is the severity of the violation. Enforcers generally wish to pursue serious
violations while allowing more minor or technical misconduct to

25. See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (“[Prosecutors] must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal
justice system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious
criminal charge.”).
26. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831 (discussing civil regulatory enforcement);
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–25 (1979) (discussing criminal
enforcement).
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27

go unpunished. Safety regulators, for obvious reasons, usually
prioritize especially risky conduct for enforcement action while
taking less aggressive action against activities that impose
lower risks. This discretionary choice requires expert
knowledge of the field of operation. For instance, experts in
mine safety are necessary to determine which types of conduct
impose substantial risk to the health of miners and which types
28
of violations are less likely to cause harm.
Despite these subject-specific aspects of enforcement, other
major components of the exercise of charging discretion are
more general. For example, state and federal administrative
agencies often sanction corporations for regulatory violations.
Corporate misconduct invariably can be traced to employee
29
misconduct. Some individual always caused the violation
through either action or omission.
This structural feature of corporations poses a hard question for enforcers: Who should be punished? Enforcers usually
have options. They can charge the company with a violation, or
they can charge the individual, or they can charge both.
There is a large literature on the merits of charging corporations for violations. As a general matter, corporations are responsible for both civil and criminal actions of their employees
30
as a matter of respondeat superior. This basic rule has certain31
ly been widely criticized. To the extent that punishment is retributive in nature, justifying corporate penalties raises complicated questions. Determining whether the corporation had the
necessary mens rea is a difficult endeavor. Is the entity charged
with the mental state of all employees or merely upper management? Similarly, retributive punishment is often justified
27. See generally Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 853, 880–87 (2012) (describing the role of violation severity in agency
penalty calculations).
28. The Mine Safety and Health Administration uses risk of harm as a
central input into penalty determinations. See 30 C.F.R. § 100.3(e) (2014).
29. See United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1200 (2d Cir. 1991). See
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006) (discussing
agency relationships).
30. See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212
U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909) (discussing criminal liability); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY § 7.03 cmt. c (discussing tort liability).
31. See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick”: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 386, 447–48 (1981); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What
Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1493–94 (1996); see also Brent
Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault,
and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1180–83 (1983).
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on the basis that it reinforces social norms of compliance. If
blameworthy violations are punished, regulated entities will
make more of an effort to comply with the law. In the corporate
context, though, punishment can and does occur even when the
32
violation expressly transgressed corporate policy.
Similar and equally difficult questions arise if penalties are
designed to deter. For example, the division between ownership
and control in the corporate context means that the stockholders effectively bear the punishment for any violation, even
though they do not make the choice to violate the rule and may
33
have taken steps to prevent it. Corporate penalties may induce aggressive compliance programs to avoid violations and
punishment, but they might not. Internal investigations may
unearth misconduct the government would never find. In a
strict vicarious liability regime where companies are held liable
for the violations they uncover, companies may prefer to turn a
34
blind eye rather than look closely at their own practices. On
the other hand, for all but the smallest penalties, charging in35
dividuals may be unrealistic. Only the corporate defendant
can pay the price necessary to internalize the costs imposed.
The difficult questions of corporate liability extend beyond
a simple binary decision to charge or not. Very frequently, the
threat of corporate charges becomes an enforcement tool to
move investigations forward and obtain other concessions from
36
the corporation. Potential corporate defendants have strong
incentives to cooperate with the government to avoid charges
against the entity. At the initial stage, this cooperation often
takes the form of an internal investigation, the results of which
are provided to the government to assist in its efforts to target
37
individual employees. Later on, the corporation may enter into agreements to defer prosecution in exchange for hiring moni32. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 526–27 (2006).
33. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways To Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (2009); John Hasnas,
The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1339 (2009).
34. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 (1994).
35. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687,
695 & n.21 (1997).
36. Lisa Kern Griffin, Inside Out Enforcement, in PROSECUTORS IN THE
BOARDROOM 110, 110–11 (Anthony Barkow & Rachel Barkow eds., 2011).
37. See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN.
L. REV. 1613, 1630–33 (2007).
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tors to ensure future compliance or to engage in other structur38
al reforms.
These are powerful tools for the government but are highly
controversial. At the investigatory stage, prosecutors can insert
themselves in the employer-employee relationship in significant ways. While the government cannot force employees to
speak, employers can compel statements on the threat of ter39
mination. Similarly, deferred prosecution arrangements put
the government between corporations and their shareholders.
External monitors strip away some of the control traditionally
held by the equity owners of corporations.
These questions about corporate liability are hard—they
have no easy answers. They do have a common characteristic,
though. They are largely independent of the subject matter of
40
the enforcement action. Whether the enforcement action involves the SEC or the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, the appropriate apportionment of penalties between individuals and the company will not depend exclusively
on the intricacies of the securities or pipeline industries. In
both cases, either the corporate mental state problem is too
great to justify punishment or the blaming function of penalties
successfully reinforces the right norms. Additionally, whether
and when the threat of corporate charges can be used to investigate or obtain compliance does not turn on the substance of
the violation. At the core, these corporate charging questions
are general enforcement issues and are largely independent of
the subject matter.
Because these issues are general in nature, we should expect a generalist agency to have policies in place to handle
them. Indeed, the DOJ has set out charging guidelines for corporate prosecutions. In 1999, Deputy Attorney General Eric
Holder promulgated the first set of guidelines outlining when
federal prosecutors should bring charges against corporations
41
for misconduct committed by their employees. The corpora38. Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 323 (2007); Peter Spivack & Sujit
Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 166–67 (2008).
39. Buell, supra note 37, at 1634.
40. Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Causes of Corporate Crime,
in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 36, at 12 (recognizing that
the basic law and economics framework of corporate enforcement “applies
across the wide array of offenses for which corporations may be held accountable”).
41. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Jus-

2126

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:2113

tion’s compliance program played a key role in determining
whether the corporation would be charged, as did the corporate
response to the investigation and cooperation with law en42
forcement. Over the last fifteen years, the DOJ has frequently
updated and modified its approach to respond to problems and
43
reflect changes in policy priorities.
In contrast, agency approaches to this decision are far less
clear. Agencies rarely have clearly established policies explaining when they will charge the organization, when they will
charge the individual, or when they will charge both. Consider
the SEC, frequently seen as one of the most effective and wellrun federal enforcement agencies. The SEC has not clearly explained when it will charge individuals and when it will charge
corporations. Not surprisingly, this lack of clarity produces un44
certainty about the agency’s policy.
Moreover, the empirical evidence on the SEC’s actual practice suggests that there may not be consistency in the agency’s
45
choices. Individuals are frequently charged, but in cases involving the largest entities and most significant violations, the
46
agency is far more likely to rely on corporate charges. The new
Chair of the SEC has suggested that enforcement may be shift-

tice, to U.S. Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June
16, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/
reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF.
42. Id.
43. Current DOJ policy is incorporated in the United States Attorneys’
Manual. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 928.000 (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp
-charging-guidelines.pdf.
44. See Michael Klausner & Jason Hegland, SEC Practice in Targeting
and Penalizing Individual Defendants (Sept. 3, 2013), https://blogs.law
.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/09/03/sec-practice-in-targeting-and-penalizing
-individual-defendants (“[I]t seems that commentators assume that the practice in question is the predominant practice of the SEC—for example, the SEC
predominantly goes after the corporation rather than individuals, or the SEC
predominantly goes after low level employees rather than the corporation.”).
45. Id. (“[O]nly 7 percent of cases involved no individual defendants. Focusing solely on cases involving at least one fraud count, only 4 percent of cases involved no individual defendants. In the remainder of cases, the SEC
named either individual defendants only or it named both the corporation and
individual defendants.”).
46. Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from
Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 700–01 (2012). Cases
involving larger firms certainly may involve different types of violations and
different evidentiary issues, yet “violation types and lack of adequate evidence
. . . do not fully account for the extensive use of these actions by the SEC.” Id.
at 701.
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ing toward more actions against individuals. Of course, these
statements do not provide the level of guidance or clarity present in a formal policy. They also do not provide a commitment
of direction beyond the Chair’s tenure in office.
At this point in the charging process, then, specialized enforcement comes with costs and benefits. Specialists have an
advantage at the specialized components of enforcement, including identifying the severity of the violation and whether it
should to be punished or ignored. Generalists have an advantage at the generalist aspects of enforcement, such as
whether to charge the corporation, the individuals, or both.
These advantages reflect a tradeoff, suggesting that neither
structural choice is always preferable in reaching the optimal
initial charging decision.
B. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: HOW MUCH?
Once enforcers select among the potential defendants and
decide that some penalty should be sought, they must turn to
the question of how much punishment. What will be the ultimate outcome of the enforcement action? Unlike the initial
charging decision, this choice does not belong simply to the enforcement agency. Enforcers retain substantial influence, but
other actors play a role. In cases that are brought in district
court, like most criminal cases and many civil enforcement actions, the district judge generally determines the penalty imposed. Even in cases that proceed purely administratively, the
agency as a whole decides the ultimate penalty, not the enforcement branch. Finally (and most importantly), the vast majority of enforcement actions end in settlement, so the ultimate
penalty involves a negotiation between the government and the
defendant. Of course, these settlement negotiations occur with
48
an eye toward the likely result if the case is fully litigated.
In this second stage of enforcement discretion, other play47. Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, SEC Exec. Comm., Deploying the Full
Enforcement Arsenal, Speech to the Council of Institutional Investors (Sept.
26, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1370539841202 (“I have made it clear that the staff should look hard to see
whether a case against individuals can be brought. I want to be sure we are
looking first at the individual conduct and working out to the entity, rather
than starting with the entity as a whole and working in. It is a subtle shift,
but one that could bring more individuals into enforcement cases.”).
48. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection
of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 190 (1993); Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of
Pretrial Negotiation, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 93, 95–102 (1992).
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ers may have a voice, but the public enforcer usually has the
loudest one. A district judge rarely will set a penalty higher
than the one proposed by the government. Similarly, settlement negotiations will end up at a point between the outcomes
the parties see as most desirable. The penalty will be lower
than the government’s preferred outcome but higher than the
defendant’s. As a result, even at this stage, the enforcer can effectively set an upper limit on the ultimate penalty. If a civil
enforcement agency seeks a $15 million civil penalty, that figure will provide a cap on the recovery. The case will certainly
be resolved, at trial or by settlement, for that amount or something less.
As is true for the initial charging decision, the enforcement
agency needs to decide how much punishment to seek. The
agency needs a mechanism to calculate its penalty position. In
cases involving a term of years or a financial penalty, the agency needs to decide on a number. Is this a $15 million case or a
$50 million case? Even if the ultimate resolution will be injunctive in nature, the agency needs to decide how harsh an injunction to seek. Will the target be barred from the industry temporarily or permanently? In the language of the criminal law,
enforcement agencies need theories of punishment.
Agencies have a range of theories to select from. For example, they might primarily focus on deterrence. If so, penalties
should be imposed in a manner sensitive to the economic effects
of violations. Pure deterrence theories assume regulated entities are rational, wealth-maximizing, and comply with regulation only when the penalties for violations are sufficiently
large. Compliance occurs if the expected punishment exceeds
49
the gain from the violation. In this framework, enforcers can
set the penalties either to require the violator to internalize the
50
51
costs caused by the violation or deter it completely. These
approaches require the enforcer to think carefully about the
probability that the violation will be detected and punished, the
harm or gain produced by the misconduct, and (for corporate
52
defendants) the extent of compliance efforts.
Alternatively, enforcers might not be interested in deter49. See Minzner, supra note 27, at 860.
50. Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169, 190–93 (1968).
51. Minzner, supra note 27, at 860–61.
52. See id. at 859. See generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997).
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rence at all. Enforcers might care about retribution instead.
Penalties set with an eye toward retribution take very different
inputs than those calculating purely on a deterrence basis. The
probability of detection, for example, drops out of the penalty
53
calculation entirely. While retributivists might care about
harm and gain, the central concern of retributive theories is the
54
mental state of the defendant. Penalties increase with more
culpable mental states and decline or disappear when the defendant’s state of mind is less blameworthy. Defendants who
intentionally cause harm deserve more punishment than those
55
doing so inadvertently. Penalty policies for retributive enforcers require a close analysis of gradations in a defendant’s state
of mind and an adjustment to reflect those differences.
Of course, these goals are not exclusive. Agencies might
care about some mix of retribution and deterrence. There is no
easy answer about which of these theories should drive criminal or civil enforcement. However, both the decisions about
theories of punishment and the implementation of those theories are generalist enforcement functions. To a significant degree, they do not depend on the regulatory subject matter.
Consider fraud enforcement as an example. A wide range
of agencies can bring actions in cases involving violators de56
frauding victims. Certainly many aspects of fraud enforcement require significant subject matter expertise. Fraud in the
securities industry can be quite different than fraud targeting
Medicaid. However, the penalty calculation in every fraud case
requires the enforcement agency to return to the same general
questions. Is this a case about deterrence where the probability
of detection should play a central role? Is it a case about retribution, where the mental state of the defendant is the primary
consideration? To what extent should gain or loss drive the ultimate punishment?
Unsurprisingly, these questions largely have answers for
the Department of Justice. As a result of the combined effect of
internal DOJ policy and the United States Sentencing Guidelines, penalty calculations are largely transparent. Assistant
53. See Richard A. Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 73–74, 83 (1980) (noting the rejection of detection
probability in retributive theories of punishment).
54. See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND
CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 171 (2009); MICHAEL S. MOORE,
PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 104 (1997).
55. MOORE, supra note 54, at 192.
56. Darryl K. Brown, The Distribution of Fraud Enforcement, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1593, 1593 (2007).
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United States Attorneys are mandated to indict defendants for
the most serious offense consistent with the evidence, defined
as the offense that produces the highest sentence under the
57
United States Sentencing Guidelines. Similarly, when offering
a plea either before or after indicting a case, the DOJ ordinarily
requires defendants to plead guilty to the most serious provable
58
offense. The calculation under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines then produces a relatively narrow range of potential
59
punishment.
In contrast, the penalty calculations within specialist
agencies are often opaque. Administrative agencies frequently
provide no guidance on the method used to calculate civil penalties. A generic reference to statutory considerations may appear in the penalty calculation, but the agency provides no clar60
ity about the underlying process. Even worse, there is some
evidence that agency penalty calculations are at odds with their
stated purposes. Elsewhere I examined the penalty policies at
the Federal Communications Commission, the Office of Foreign
Assets Control, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the
61
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Each of the
agencies has stated that its primary purpose in imposing penalties is deterrence, rejecting retribution as a rationale. However, for each agency, the factors considered in the penalty process are strongly consistent with a retributive rationale but are
62
inconsistent with deterrence-based theories of punishment.
Like the discretionary decision about who to punish, the
question of how much punishment is appropriate is not a purely specialized task. It certainly depends in part on detailed information about the regulated industry. Specialized agencies
have a significant advantage at this component of the punishment calculus. However, the relative significance of different
theories of punishment in the enforcement process, and the
mechanism used to convert those theories into practice, is a
question about enforcement generally. Since these skills are in
tension, we again see a tradeoff in the value of specialist and
generalist enforcement.
57. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 43, at 9-27.300.
58. Id. at 9-27.330 (preindictment pleas); id. at 9-27.430 (postindictment
pleas).
59. In fraud cases, the gain to the violator or the loss to the victim is the
primary determinant of the ultimate penalty. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2014).
60. Minzner, supra note 27, at 864–65.
61. Id. at 866–67.
62. Id. at 869–77.
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C. REWARDS, WHISTLEBLOWERS, AND COOPERATORS
Effective enforcement requires information. In practice, the
best information about violations belongs to those closest to the
63
misconduct. For individual violators, the people best positioned to provide testimony are friends, neighbors, and coconspirators. In the corporate context, employees, both those
involved in the violation and those nearby, are invaluable to effective enforcers.
As a result, enforcement agencies are often faced with the
difficult decision of whether and how to provide the appropriate
incentives to expose this information. One approach is to impose a cost on those who conceal the information. For example,
the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act created affirmative reporting ob64
ligations for high-level corporate executives. For these individuals, concealing evidence of securities fraud can lead to individual liability. Similarly, mandatory reporting statutes in
the context of abuse have become common. Individuals who fail
to disclose evidence of abuse of children (or other vulnerable
victims) can be criminally prosecuted or held liable in a civil ac65
tion.
Alternatively, enforcement authorities can try to provide
affirmative benefits to those who decide to come forward. Perhaps the most common form that this benefit takes is protection from third-party consequences, usually from an employer.
Whistleblowers who provide information about corporate misconduct are often protected from termination or other negative
employment consequences as a result of the information they
66
provide. In the securities industry, Sarbanes-Oxley provides
this protection for those who provide information, enforced with
both criminal and civil consequences for individuals who retali67
ate against whistle-blowers. The protection is common in oth68
er industries as well.
In addition to this incentive, enforcement agencies can
provide benefits directly to individuals providing information.
63. See generally Miriam Hechler Baer, Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH. U.
L. REV. 903 (2011) (describing the use of cooperating criminal defendants by
prosecutors).
64. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2014).
65. See generally Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The
Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for
Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1163 (2010) (outlining these and
other examples).
66. Id. at 1161–63.
67. Id. at 1161.
68. Id.
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In its simplest form, this benefit consists of monetary compensation for information. Enforcement agencies can pay people to
talk. The DOJ has statutory authorization to make such pay69
ments and frequently uses it. The Drug Enforcement Administration alone has thousands of informants on its payroll at
70
any given time. Similar programs exist in the world of civil
enforcement. For instance, starting in 2006, the Internal Revenue Service can now pay informants up to thirty percent of the
71
taxes collected as a result of the information provided.
Aside from money, enforcers can trade their discretion.
Where individual charges are possible, the enforcement agency
can reduce or eliminate the liability in exchange for the information. This type of bargain is extremely common in criminal
cases. The most formalized and best-documented structure occurs in the federal system. Criminal cooperators plead guilty to
a cooperation agreement and provide information to the prose72
cutors about the criminal conduct of others. In return, the
government makes a motion to the district judge authorizing a
73
reduction of the sentence below the level prescribed by the
United States Sentencing Guidelines as well as below any otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentence. Such motions
are made in a significant fraction of federal criminal prosecu74
tions and are particularly common in narcotics cases. In the
corporate context, the DOJ considers cooperation in its decision
about whether to charge the entity in addition to the individu75
als.
More informally, prosecutors can drop charges completely
or never even initiate a case in exchange for information. In the
corporate context, the DOJ operates a longstanding policy of
immunity from antitrust prosecutions for the first entity to re-

69. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 886(a) (2012).
70. U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT DIV.,
THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION’S PAYMENTS TO CONFIDENTIAL
SOURCES (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/DEA/a05/
final.pdf (“According to the DEA, it has approximately 4,000 active confidential sources at any one time.”).
71. I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2006).
72. See generally Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and
Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2573 (2008) (describing the cooperation
process).
73. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 59, § 5K1.1.
74. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, tbl.5.36 (2010) (substantial assistance departures made
in 11.5% of cases overall; 24.6% of drug trafficking cases).
75. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 43, at 9-28.700.
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76

port a violation. This “first-in-the-door” rule allows the initial
company providing information to escape charges entirely. Police themselves may never even bring the case to the attention
of a prosecutor, releasing a suspect in the field as a result of ev77
idence provided at the time of arrest. Data on these more informal arrangements are much more difficult to collect for obvious reasons, but the information that is available suggests
they are very common. Notably, the overwhelming majority of
search warrant applications reflect a reliance on informant in78
formation.
Whether compensated in leniency or in money, informants
are a high risk/high reward proposition for enforcement agencies. On the benefit side, informants bring enormous value to
79
the enforcement process. They allow high-level individuals to
be targeted who have shielded themselves from other forms of
incriminating evidence. Equally important, the simple prospect
that coconspirators may eventually speak to law enforcement
reduces trust in criminal organizations. As a result, the initial
80
formation of agreements to violate the law becomes less likely.
However, cooperators also present real dangers. Recruiting
the wrong cooperators or inadequately vetting their claims can
produce disaster. Law enforcement runs the risk of both overly
generous reductions for the cooperator and the possibility of re81
lying on false testimony. The second concern, of course, is the
most significant danger that comes with the use of testimony of
criminal witnesses promised leniency. Enforcement agencies
always run the risk that a witness will derive the benefits of
82
cooperation through perjured testimony.

76. See SCOTT D. HAMMOND, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S LENIENCY PROGRAM AND
MODEL LENIENCY LETTERS (NOVEMBER 19, 2008) at 5, available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/239583.pdf.
77. See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal
Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 659 (2004).
78. Id. at 657.
79. Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1, 59–60 (2012). See generally Baer, supra note 63,
at 920–30.
80. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 79, at 59; see also Neal Kumar
Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1340 (2003).
81. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND
THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 33, 70–76 (2009); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 952–53 (1999).
82. See NATAPOFF, supra note 81, at 70–72.

2134

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:2113
83

These risks are real, but can be minimized. Undetected
perjury is more likely in some situations than others. For example, jailhouse informants who claim to have had post-arrest
conversations with the defendants pose a far greater risk of
perjury than cooperators working undercover who are record84
ing conversations with potential targets. Similarly, a deep understanding of the value of corroboration as a mechanism of lie
detection significantly reduces the dangers of cooperation
85
agreements.
A generalist enforcement agency has the advantage of repeatedly handling cooperators, developing both the expertise in
lie detection and the policy structures that help guide its use
effectively. In contrast, specialized agencies are likely to use
them far less often. This relative lack of experience increases
the probability of bad outcomes when agencies do begin to rely
on their information.
In practice, cooperating witnesses were traditionally largely unused by agencies. Unlike the DOJ, administrative agencies generally do not have standard cooperation agreements,
although some agencies do have whistleblower polices that provide greater or lesser degrees of protection for individuals
86
providing information. As a result, administrative agencies
historically likely missed out on the value of informant testimony in building strong regulatory investigations. There is
some evidence of agencies suffering in this respect. For example, the SEC had multiple opportunities to detect the Madoff
fraud at a much earlier stage based on information provided by
a financial analyst who had determined that Madoff’s returns
87
were impossible. The SEC struggled to handle the information
88
in part because it came from an unusual or unexpected source.
Other agencies have had similar problems effectively integrat89
ing and taking advantage of this type of information.
83. Baer, supra note 63, at 932, 941–42 (describing techniques that prosecutors use to reduce cooperator lies).
84. Id. at 942 (discussing the value of undercover work in corroborating a
cooperator’s claim).
85. See Minzner, supra note 72, at 2572–73.
86. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1) (2012) (providing statutory protection
for IRS whistleblowers).
87. For a short, readable account of the SEC handling of the whistleblower information, see Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal,
Three Narratives in Search of a Story, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 899, 900.
88. See id. at 909–10.
89. See Mariano-Florention Cuéllar, The Institutional Logic of Preventive
Crime, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 36, at 137 (describing
FDA use of informants in tobacco investigations including reliance on the
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More recently, agencies have begun to move in the direction of paying bounties to individuals that provide information
that produces recoveries. The IRS has had a long-standing
bounty program but dramatically expanded and reshaped it in
90
2006. As part of the Dodd-Frank legislation, Congress authorized payments to whistleblowers and the SEC adopted imple91
menting regulations in 2011. The Center for Medicaid and
Medicare Services, a branch of the Department of Health and
Human Services, has proposed a similar bounty program that
92
would make payments in cases involving health care fraud. To
the extent that agencies are now beginning to rely on this type
of information, they will face the opposite problem. They will
run the risk of false testimony and (potentially) damaged investigations.
Like the other aspects of enforcement discussed in this section, the evaluation of information from informants and the
creation of appropriate incentives have specialist and generalist elements. Doing these tasks well involves drawing on both
industry-specific knowledge and generalist enforcement capacity. As a result, specialized enforcement comes with tradeoffs
that must be managed.
III. SPECIALIZED ENFORCEMENT: STRUCTURAL
WEAKNESSES & STRENGTHS
Thus far, I have focused on the experiential tradeoff resulting from the choice between specialist and generalist enforcement. This Part considers the consequences of the structural
choice of specialized enforcement. I initially consider two
weaknesses that arise when enforcement is specialized and
fragmented. First, specialized enforcement varies in aggressiveness in response to shifts in public scrutiny. Because agency enforcement usually receives little attention, regulatory capture can lead specialized enforcers to be less aggressive than a
generalist agency. However, after a catastrophe, specialist enforcers face pressure to do something, leading to more aggresskills of criminal investigators in handling informants).
90. See Franziska Hertel, Note, Qui Tam for Tax?: Lessons from the
States, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1908–09 (2013) (describing the IRS program).
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012) (authorizing payments of awards to whistleblowers); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-1 to 240.21F-17 (2014) (implementing regulations for whistleblower incentives and protections).
92. See Medicare Program; Requirements for the Medicare Incentive Reward Program and Provider Enrollment, 78 Fed. Reg. 25013, 25016 (Apr. 29,
2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 420, 424, and 498).
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sive enforcement than a generalist agency. Second, agencies
can only control their own enforcement program but regulated
entities must consider the actions of all potential enforcers.
This difference in focus between enforcer and target produces
negative consequences for specialized enforcers.
The last two Sections consider the corresponding structural
benefits of specialized enforcement. Specialist enforcers have
an advantage because they have access to the other tools of
administrative regulation. Generalist enforcers are limited because their choice is restricted to individual, case-by-case decisions to proceed with an enforcement action or refrain from
charging. Agencies, though, bring a wide variety of other tools
to the enforcement calculus—they can modify the substantive
law, alter the enforcement process itself, and draw on other
agency experts to implement enforcement injunctions and consent decrees. Finally, specialist enforcers are better able to respond and alter compliance norms that already exist in regulated entities. Because agency enforcers are close to the
regulated industry, norm discovery, evaluation, and alteration
are all easier for specialists when compared to generalists.
A. THE CYCLICAL NATURE OF SPECIALIZED ENFORCEMENT
Most of the time, agency enforcement occurs outside of the
view of the public. The actions of most federal regulatory agencies are invisible in ordinary times. Enforcement is no exception. However, two important groups are always paying attention to agency enforcement and can influence its direction.
First, the community regulated by the agency keeps a close eye
on agency enforcement at all times—they pay the penalties
that the agency imposes. This regulated community can easily
affect enforcement choices (or other agency decisions) through
its influence over Congressional oversight, activity that falls
under the broad label of regulatory capture. Second, the agency
itself and its employees are always aware of the enforcement
choices and naturally have influence on the direction of agency
enforcement. At times of low public scrutiny, actions by these
two groups can pressure agencies toward underenforcement.
93
Capture has become recognized as one of the central impediments to optimal policy regimes. The core insight of capture theory is a straightforward application of the principal93. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Organization of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284 (2006) (“Sometime
in the middle of last century, ‘capture theory’ became the dominant paradigm
of bureaucratic behavior.”).
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agent problem. If the public is the principal, acting through the
government as its agent, capture occurs when the agent stops
seeking to serve the goals of the principal and instead pursues
94
the ends of a third party. For administrative agencies, the key
third parties are regulated entities—agencies get captured
when they become controlled by those industries they regulate.
All government structures can be threatened by capture
but federal administrative agencies are particularly vulnera95
ble. They regulate highly organized sectors of the economy
with deep pockets. As a result, regulated entities have the capacity to resist unfavorable agency actions both directly and
indirectly. For example, regulated entities are well positioned
to directly influence agency rulemaking both initially, at the
point when they are written through the notice-and-comment
96
process, and later, through court challenges to the rules that
97
the agency adopts. Regulated entities can have at least as
94. For a recent overview of capture theory, see generally Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction to PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE:
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 1–22 (Daniel Carpenter
& David A. Moss eds., 2012). Foundational articles on capture as a principalagent problem include Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, & Barry Weingast,
Administrative Procedures As Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON &
ORG. 243 (1987), and Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role
of Collusion in Organizations, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181 (1986).
95. Barkow, supra note 13, at 22–23 (identifying features of agencies that
make capture a particularly serious problem).
96. In the pre-Internet era, large entities that were repeat players with
the agency consistently dominated the commenting process. See generally
Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 949–952 (2006). More recently, some studies have noted that in some individual rulemakings, the majority of comments filed come
from the public. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 414 (2005); David C. Nixon et al., With
Friends Like These: Rule-Making Comment Submissions to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 59, 64 (2002). However, a careful review by Professor Coglianese suggests that those rulemakings appear to be outliers. Coglianese, supra, at 964. Of course, the volume of comments does not necessarily measure their impact. There is at least
some empirical evidence, though, that comments play a significant role in
shaping policy. See Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch:
The Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16
J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 103, 105 (2006); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan
Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on
the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 128 (2006).
97. Judicial review has traditionally been viewed as a central mechanism
preventing agency capture, but more recent scholarship has called that assumption into question. Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rulemakings: An Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1717, 1726–29 (2012) (reviewing literature on the changing perception of
the roles of courts in preventing agency capture). While the evidence is mixed,
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much impact indirectly, through campaign donations and other
forms of political influence over the Congressional committees
that approve budgets, conduct hearings, and otherwise oversee
98
agency activities.
The capture problem can appear in virtually any type of
agency action. However, the particular difficulties that capture
presents to the enforcement function of administrative agencies
have only recently begun to receive significant academic atten99
tion. Applying general results about capture, though, suggests
that capture is apt to be an especially serious problem with certain types of agency activities.
First, capture concerns are greater when the costs of agency actions are localized but the benefits are spread widely. The
theoretical literature on agency capture demonstrates that capture concerns are most severe when the public benefits from
regulatory activity are diffuse while private costs are concen100
trated on a limited number of firms. Those firms have the incentive and the ability to coordinate their actions to resist the
administrative action while the beneficiaries have neither the
ability nor the desire to fight hard in support.
Second, the risk of capture depends on agency scope:
whether an agency regulates a single industry or a more di101
verse community of entities. Agencies regulating a narrow
industry are at greater risk than agencies with broader portfolios. The securities industry naturally has substantial influence
over the SEC and the mining industry plays a substantial role
in shaping the actions of the MSHA. However, agencies that
regulate multiple industries avoid single-industry capture because the diverse constituencies do not all push in the same dilitigation may further capture as much as restrain it. See id. at 1786–89. At
the very least, industry participants are well-placed to play a key role in any
court challenges either on offense or defense.
98. See generally, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the
Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992);
Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures As Instruments of
Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress, 96 J. POL. ECON.
132 (1988).
99. See Barkow, supra note 13, at 22; Lemos, supra note 11, at 717; Rose,
supra note 12, at 2200.
100. See generally THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 367–70 (James Q. Wilson
ed., 1980); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1–3 (1965).
101. Jonathan Macey has called this issue the “most fundamental choice of
agency design.” Macey, supra note 98, at 93; see also Barkow, supra note 13, at
50.
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102

rection.
Combining these two features suggests important results
for specialist enforcement. First, even compared to other agency actions, the costs of enforcement actions are especially concentrated and the benefits especially diffuse. The consequences
of enforcement fall on the target alone while the beneficiaries
are the public at large. Similarly, the target of specialized enforcement will naturally come from the regulated community
and will be able to exploit the vulnerability of the specialized
agency. As a result, when the public is not paying much attention, specialist enforcement agencies face substantial pressure
to undercharge, undersettle, and undercollect in enforcement
actions.
These pressures in times of limited public attention are reduced for generalist agencies. Agencies that just enforce and
target entities in different industries may face the pressure of
capture, but it is far more difficult to bring to bear. The lack of
a concentrated industry to work through Congress protects
generalist enforcement agencies. Moreover, generalist enforcers
always receive some level of public scrutiny. The generalist enforcers at the state and federal level, Attorneys General and
103
the Department of Justice, are frequently in the news. As a
result, the pressure from regulated entities is far less likely to
guide their enforcement programs.
These dynamics reverse when attention turns to enforcement. In ordinary times, capture is a problem producing downward pressure on agency enforcement because of limited public
attention. In extraordinary times, the opposite is true. Agency
enforcement sometimes becomes highly visible. Following a
dramatic enforcement failure, such as the Deepwater Horizon
104
105
oil spill or the Upper Big Branch mine collapse, the salience
of enforcement changes. In those cases, historically invisible
agencies like the Minerals Management Service or the MSHA,
102. See Macey, supra note 98, at 99.
103. See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 879 (2014) (noting that the Department of Justice and state Attorneys General, along with the SEC, are always in the public
eye).
104. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL &
OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE
OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 87 (2011), available at http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO
-OILCOMMISSION.pdf (describing the explosion and spill).
105. GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, UPPER BIG BRANCH: THE
APRIL 5, 2010 EXPLOSION: A FAILURE OF BASIC COAL MINE SAFETY PRACTICES
4 (2011), available at http://npr.org/documents/2011/may/giip-massey
-report.pdf (describing the mine collapse).
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106

receive substantial public scrutiny. Congressional attention
follows public attention. Because the public becomes interested
in enforcement, Congress does as well. Committee hearings investigating agency enforcement practices are a common re107
sponse to disasters.
This scrutiny reverses the pressure on enforcement at specialist agencies. While specialists are likely to underenforce
compared to generalists during times of low visibility, the opposite effect should occur during times of high visibility. External
and internal forces will push specialist agencies in the direction
of enforcement in times of high scrutiny. Indeed, that dynamic
is frequently observed. Agencies become far more interested in
building their reputation as aggressive enforcers in the wake of
a serious tragedy. For example, many agencies promote their
108
enforcement results in their Congressional budget requests.
However, while high-profile agencies like the SEC and the
CFTC generally engage in this self-promotion in all circumstances, lower profile agencies only draw attention to their en109
forcement successes after a major disaster. Specialized agencies care about appearing aggressive, but only when the public
110
is focused on enforcement.
Similar effects happen even in high profile agencies. High
profile events have frequently pushed the SEC to enforce in ar111
eas previously left untouched. The agency recently received
substantial attention relating to its enforcement in the area of
options backdating. In these cases, employees received stock
options with the dates retroactively assigned to make them

106. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL &
OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra note 104 at 68 (describing Minerals Management
Service failings); GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra note 105,
at 77 (describing critiques of the Mine Safety and Health Administration).
107. See, e.g., Ian Urbina, Authorities Vow To Close Mines Found To Be
Unsafe, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2010, at A16 (describing Congressional hearings
on the Mine Safety and Health Administration and the Big Branch mine collapse); Susan Saulny, Finger-Pointing, but Few Answers at Hearings on Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A14 (describing the Congressional hearings
on the Deepwater Horizon disaster).
108. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 103, at 882–83.
109. Id. at 882.
110. Id. at 883 (“[A]gencies’ incentive to build reputations as strong enforcers . . . is variable and depends on the level of public attention directed at the
agencies’ enforcement programs.”).
111. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the
SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26 (2003); Stephen J. Choi et al., Scandal Enforcement at the SEC: The Arc of the Option Backdating Investigations, 15 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 542, 546 (2013).
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112

more valuable at the time they were granted. This area did
not receive much press coverage until a flurry of stories was
published in 2006. This surge of attention produced, predicta113
bly, a surge in enforcement actions. A recent empirical study,
though, suggests that this was far from an optimal response,
producing enforcement actions that were progressively weaker
114
over time. These results suggest that the SEC, like all specialized agencies, is subject to political pressures that drive an
115
overreaction to enforcement failures.
This combination of high and low public visibility of agency
activities leads to a boom and bust cycle of enforcement for specialized agencies—agencies underenforce on a given issue most
of the time, but can overreact after a significant catastrophe.
Generalist enforcement agencies are not immune to these pressures, of course. Scrutiny following an enforcement failure can
induce a response at the DOJ as well. However, it is more
shielded from these effects. At specialized agencies, the highs
are higher and the lows are lower. The combination of capture
and limited public scrutiny put more downward pressure on
specialized enforcement. Similarly, when salience shifts, the
upward response is greater.
B. SPECIALIZED ENFORCEMENT AND THE SILO EFFECT
In a world of specialized enforcement, overlapping jurisdic116
tion is inevitable. Multiple agencies frequently regulate the
same entity. As a result, that entity reacts to the incentives
created by multiple enforcement divisions. Nuclear power
plants, for example, respond to several masters. The NRC initially licenses power plant activities and generally oversees
117
their safe operation. However, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), with state and local authorities, regulates many
118
of the environmental aspects of power plant operations. This
112. See Choi et al., supra note 111, at 543.
113. Id. at 546–47.
114. Id. at 575.
115. Id. at 546 (“The SEC’s response to option backdating suggests that it
is not immune to the political imperative to ‘do something.’”).
116. See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in
Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 208 (“[S]tatutes that parcel out
authority or jurisdiction to multiple agencies may be the norm, rather than an
exception.”).
117. See generally Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, 10 C.F.R. § 50 (2014) (providing for NRC regulation of the construction
and operation of power plants).
118. See generally Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nu-
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joint regulation means that the actions of any regulator can
constrain the power plant’s activities. Consider the Oyster
Creek Generating Station in New Jersey, the oldest nuclear
119
power plant in the United States. In 2009, the NRC extended
the plant’s license for an additional twenty years despite public
120
opposition.
However, Exelon, the owner of the plant announced in 2010 that the plant would be retired in 2019, ten
years early, blaming environmental regulations enforced by the
121
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.
Oyster Creek is simply one example of a general phenomenon. Simultaneous regulation of the same entity is common.
For example, entities in the energy industry often own nuclear
plants regulated by the NRC and coal plants overseen by the
EPA. If the company is public, the SEC will regulate its securities filing. Such entities have choices to make. Because compliance budgets are not unlimited, companies need to decide
where to focus their attention. Quite naturally, large penalties
will get the most attention and the greatest efforts at compliance.
To the extent that specialized agencies set penalties optimally, these efforts are desirable. When Enforcer A consistently
imposes larger penalties than Enforcer B, those penalties
might show that Enforcer A consistently identifies more serious
violations. Nevertheless, we know that this tends not to be
122
true. In Predictably Incoherent Judgments, Cass Sunstein,
Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and Ilana Ritov demonstrated that agency punishments are internally consistent but
externally incoherent. Specialized agencies scale their penalties
against other penalties for violations enforced by the same
agency but not against penalties imposed by other regulators.
Consider the penalties imposed by the Occupational Safety &
Health Administration and those imposed by the Fish and
Wildlife Service. The penalties for illegally importing wildlife
clear Power Operations, 40 C.F.R. § 190 (2014) (outlining EPA regulation of
radiation exposure from power plants).
119. The plant came online in 1969 operating under a forty-year license
issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See Oyster Creek Generating
Station, EXELON, http://www.exeloncorp.com/PowerPlants/oystercreek/Pages/
profile.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
120. See Press Release, NRC Renews Operating License for Oyster Creek
Nuclear Power Plant for an Additional 20 Years (April 8, 2009), available at
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0909/ML090980482.pdf.
121. See Matthew L. Wald, Oyster Creek Reactor To Be Closed by 2019,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010, at A44 (describing agreement to close plant).
122. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 1153 (2002).
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are substantially larger than those imposed for serious work123
place safety violations.
As a result, the fact that large penalties draw significant
compliance efforts can be distortionary. Regulated entities will
focus their efforts on the agency imposing the largest penalties
even when those penalties do not reflect the most serious violation. A generalist enforcement agency, of course, could end up
with inconsistent penalties across the various violations it enforces, but the simple fact that a single body oversees the enforcement efforts reduces the problem. Because enforcement
agencies do frequently scale penalties appropriately internally,
the distortion is reduced.
So far the analysis has assumed only that the regulated
entity is identical. These problems are compounded when two
enforcers can punish not only the same entity, but also the
same conduct. Misconduct by a defendant does not necessarily
stay neatly within the lines draw by statute. As a result, a single violation might face charges from multiple enforcers. The
enforcement actions might be contemporaneous. For example,
simultaneous enforcement is common in securities cases, where
the DOJ and the SEC pursue actions against a defendant at
124
the same time. Alternatively, defendants might face sequential enforcement. In such cases, the resolution of an enforcement action might produce collateral consequences outside the
jurisdiction of the original enforcer. Certain administrative enforcement actions (such as a range of EPA Clean Water Act and
125
Clean Air Act cases) can lead to debarment. Notably, violators are either temporarily or permanently precluded from en123. Id. at 1190.
124. The Rajat Gupta insider trading case provides a recent example of the
interaction between SEC and DOJ investigations. The SEC initially filed
charges on its own against Gupta administratively in March of 2011 but then
abandoned the case in August. See Peter Lattman, S.E.C. Drops Proceeding
Against Rajat Gupta, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2011), http://dealbook
.nytimes.com/2011/08/04s-e-c-drops-administrative-proceeding-against-gupta.
It then recharged the case in district court once Gupta was indicted criminally.
See SEC Files Insider Trading Charges Against Rajat Gupta, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/
2011-223.htm. Gupta was eventually convicted in June 2012. See Peter
Lattman & Azam Ahmed, Ex-Goldman Director Convicted of Passing Secrets
to Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A1.
125. Criminal convictions lead to automatic debarment while the EPA has
discretionary debarment authority for other forms of misconduct. See generally
Justin M. Davidson, Comment, Polluting Without Consequence: How BP and
Other Large Government Contractors Evade Suspension and Debarment for
Environmental Crime and Misconduct, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 257, 261–63
(2011) (describing debarment authority).
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tering into any federal contract, not just contracts with the
126
agency imposing debarment. All federal agencies must enforce the debarment order.
Both sequential and simultaneous enforcement actions can
cross other enforcement boundaries as well. State, federal and
127
private enforcement often punish the same conduct. Securi128
ties class actions are often filed after SEC investigations. En129
forcement by other agencies produces similar outcomes.
Naturally, enforcement targets tend to be indifferent between the direct and collateral consequences of an enforcement
action. A $10 million payment to the EPA that leads to the violator losing out on a series of federal procurement contracts
worth $50 million over five years is likely to be less attractive
than a one-time $25 million payment that does not lead to debarment. Enforcement targets will always see cases holistically, aggregating the direct and collateral costs in determining
130
how to proceed.
In comparison, enforcement agencies cannot take a holistic
approach. Almost by definition, only the direct consequences of
an agency enforcement action are within its control. The collateral consequences lie outside its jurisdiction. This mismatch between the defendant’s concerns and the agency’s capacities has
a significant impact on settlement negotiations. Standard models of settlement recognize that parties in agency enforcement
126. See 2 C.F.R. § 180 (2014) (outlining procedures to enforce cross-agency
debarment).
127. The $25 billion dollar settlement in February 2012 between states, the
federal government and large banks providing mortgage services is simply one
of many recent examples of joint federal-state enforcement actions. See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits By
State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 526 (2012). States often also
have authorization to enforce federal law directly, but generally cannot do so
when a federal enforcement action is pending. See Lemos, supra note 11, at
709.
128. See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action
Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utitlity of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 103, 156 (2006); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney
General: Why the Model of the Lawyer As Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42
MD. L. REV. 215, 225 (1983).
129. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 128, at 131 (describing class actions after Federal Trade Commission enforcement activity).
130. Not surprisingly, members of the enforcement defense bar explicitly
advise their clients to consider all of the collateral consequences when negotiating an enforcement settlement. See Carmen Lawrence et al., Seeing Beyond
the Deal: The Collateral Consequences of SEC Settlements, INV. LAWYER, Nov.
2011, at 1, available at http://www.hb.betterregulation.com/external/Seeing%
20Beyond%20the%20Deal%20The%20Collateral%20Consequences%20of%20S
EC%20Settlements.pdf.
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actions will negotiate in light of the probability of a government
victory at trial or hearing and the likely consequences of that
131
victory. For example, assuming perfect information on both
sides, if the parties place a seventy-five percent likelihood on a
pro-government outcome at trial and expect an average $20
million penalty to be imposed if the government wins, the case
will likely settle earlier for about $15 million.
Collateral consequences alter this calculus. If settlements
and government trial victories both lead to follow-on enforcement actions by others, a pretrial resolution may become impossible. As a general matter, agencies can, for example, increase or decrease the settlement amount but cannot offer
immunity from future civil suits. However, if the defendant loses at trial, issue preclusion may work to its detriment in later
132
lawsuits. Similarly, admissions of wrongdoing in a settlement
133
agreement may be admissible into evidence. In cases where
the likely costs of future civil litigation are low, a reduction in
the penalty may be sufficient to mitigate this collateral consequence and induce a settlement. However, where the collateral
consequences are severe, penalty reductions will not be enough.
Even if the agency reduces the direct impact of the enforcement
action to zero and imposes no penalty in the settlement, the
threat of subsequent civil suits may prevent a resolution. Consider the example above, where the parties expect a seventyfive percent chance of a government win at trial leading to an
average penalty of $20 million. If the future civil actions resulting from a settlement will cost the target only $5 million on average, the enforcement agency will be able to reduce the settlement amount to $10 million and still induce the target to
take the offer. If, however, the lawsuits resulting from settlement will produce $500 million in average liability, even a set134
tlement offer of zero will be declined. The target will certainly
131. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is
Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 495–96 (1996); George L. Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
132. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330–31 (1979)
(nonmutual issue preclusion after SEC enforcement action); Max Minzner,
Saving Stare Decisis: Preclusion, Precedent, and Procedural Due Process, 2010
BYU L. REV. 597, 598.
133. The Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as parallel state evidence
codes, make such statements generally admissible. See FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2).
134. At least in the enforcement context, it is common that the potential
future consequences are far greater than the immediate penalty. See Gilles &
Friedman, supra note 128, at 157–58 & n.204 (“The SEC, FTC, and DOJ all
know that the real financial wallop, in most instances, will come from the pri-
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135

prefer to roll the dice and go to trial.
In theory, then, the existence of alternate enforcement actions might produce more trials. As a result, specialized enforcers should settle less often than generalists. In practice, enforcement agencies work with targets to alter their settlement
practices to reduce or eliminate these spillover effects. Settlements are structured to reduce or eliminate the secondary effects that would occur after trial. These effects are easiest to
see in the situations where the collateral consequences are
greatest. For example, criminal defendants who are not United
States citizens frequently care far more about the potential
immigration consequences of their conviction than the prison
136
sentence. As a result, plea negotiations for noncitizens often
turn on whether the prosecutor and defense attorney can reach
a resolution that involves a guilty plea only to offenses that do
137
not lead to deportation. As a result, the specialization of enforcement, i.e. the separation between the criminal and immigration enforcement functions, means that defendants plead
guilty to different crimes than they would if a single generalist
138
enforcer controlled both functions.
vate class actions that follow their investigations.”).
135. In reality, the calculation is more complicated than presented in this
stylized example. For instance, civil suits are likely to occur whether or not the
defendant settles with the agency and, as a result, the key question is the
marginal impact of the settlement on the outcome of the civil case.
136. Especially for adult defendants who entered the country years earlier,
the consequences of deportation and the resulting separation from home and
family can matter far more than the length of incarceration. See Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010) (recognizing that deportation is “sometimes the most important part . . . of the penalty that may be imposed on
noncitizen[s]”).
137. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Padilla presumes that
the plea process will involve negotiating around these immigration consequences. The Court held that defendants who are misinformed about immigration consequences may bring an ineffective assistance claim, noting that defense counsel “may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in
order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the
removal consequence.” Id. at 373. For an analysis of whether such negotiations
are likely in practice, see Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter
(Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1399 (2011).
138. Giving state prosecutors control over deportation consequences is both
unrealistic and (perhaps) unconstitutional. However, even in federal criminal
cases, criminal and immigration enforcement are separate. The Department of
Justice, acting either directly or through a United States Attorney, negotiates
the resolution of the criminal case and the Department of Homeland Security
handles any later immigration consequences. Deportation is not an issue open
to negotiation in the criminal case. See Agreements in Connection with Criminal Proceedings or Investigations, Promising Non-Deportation or Other Immi-
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The same phenomenon occurs in civil enforcement. The
SEC has adjusted its enforcement approach to generate settlements in cases where the potential collateral consequences
might otherwise force cases to trial. Targets of SEC investigations are very frequently concerned about the possibility of civil
lawsuits predicated on the same conduct at issue in the enforcement action. These lawsuits can lead to exposure far
139
greater than the penalties imposed by the agency. In response, the SEC (along with other agencies) adopted a longstanding practice permitting enforcement targets not to admit
140
liability when settling enforcement actions. Instead, settlement agreements state that targets neither admit nor deny the
allegations. The express purpose of this policy is to permit settlements that, in theory, will not directly lead to exposure in
141
private actions. While the lawsuit can still be filed, the settlement itself will not be useful to the plaintiffs. If the SEC
could extinguish private claims through the public investigation, this settlement policy would be unnecessary. Companies
could admit liability without fear of future consequences. Here
again the specialization of enforcement, i.e. the split between
public and private, means that enforcement actions are resolved differently than they would in a universe with a generalist enforcer.
These different outcomes have costs. Admissions of wrongdoing have both intrinsic and extrinsic value. They bring closure, induce introspection and remorse in defendants, and
bring procedural and legitimacy benefits to enforcement sys142
tems. Requiring an admission of liability helps prevent the
conviction of the innocent by requiring defendants to describe
gration Benefits, 28 C.F.R. § 0.197 (2014) (explaining that immigration officials are not bound by promises in plea agreements).
139. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1542–43
(2006); Gilles & Friedman, supra note 128, at 157–58.
140. Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public
Enforcement of Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505 (2013) (describing SEC practice).
141. See Examining the Settlment Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112 Cong. 83 (2012) (testimony of
Robert Khuzami, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2012/
ts051712rk.htm (“The reality is that many companies likely would refuse to
settle cases if they were required to affirmatively admit unlawful conduct or
facts related to that conduct. This is because such admissions would not only
expose them to additional lawsuits by private litigants seeking damages, but
would also risk a ‘collateral estoppel’ effect in such lawsuits.”).
142. Buell, supra note 140, at 513 (describing these values served by admissions).
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143

under oath what they did. It also helps ensure public confidence by avoiding an outcome in which defendants repeatedly
144
deny conduct they are punished for. The SEC’s “neither admit
nor deny” approach sacrifices these benefits. Similarly, it is not
at all hard to imagine criminal defendants pleading guilty to a
crime they did not commit to avoid the deportation consequenc145
es of their actual offense.
These costs will occur in every enforcement structure
where a single agency does not control all of the consequences
of an enforcement action. Following Dodd-Frank, the SEC imposed new reporting requirements on publicly traded compa146
nies that operate mines. Starting in 2012, these companies
were required to disclose certain categories of MSHA sanctions
147
to investors. It is too soon to see the impact of this requirement. However, assuming mining companies expect these disclosures to have a significant negative impact on stock prices,
this SEC requirement will alter the MSHA penalty negotiation
process. The MSHA cannot exempt mining companies from the
SEC obligation but it can, in theory, structure settlements to
avoid the triggering conditions.
These costs may be worth paying. As discussed in the next
Part, there is value in specialization in enforcement as well.
There are strong arguments for not placing the obligation to enforce securities regulation and mine safety in the same agency.
Additionally, permitting public enforcers to directly preclude
148
private lawsuits creates serious implementation problems.
143. The central purpose of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, which
requires the court to determine that there is a factual basis for a guilty plea, is
to prevent pleas by innocent defendants. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory
committee’s note. This requirement is frequently met by requiring a defendant
to testify to the facts necessary to make out the elements of the crime. Buell,
supra note 140, at 508–09.
144. Id. at 513.
145. It is widely understood that innocent defendants may have the incentive to plead guilty if the costs of going to trial are sufficiently high. See, e.g.,
Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1120 & n.5
(2008) (citing additional sources).
146. See Mine Safety Disclosure, Exchange Act Releases Nos. 33-9286, 3466019 (Jan. 27, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33
-9286.pdf (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229).
147. Id.
148. Unlike many other agencies, EPA enforcement actions can be barred
by state enforcement actions and either state or EPA enforcement can preclude private causes of action. See Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in
Statutory Preclusions Against Successive Environmental Enforcement Actions
by EPA Citizens Part One: Statutory Bars in Citzen Suit Provisions, 28 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 401, 403 (2004). This structure has created complicated prob-
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This analysis simply identifies a new cost of fragmented enforcement in a world of collateral consequences. Unlike a specialist agency, a generalist enforcer can directly offer holistic
resolution of all of the potential consequences of the defendant’s
conduct. Specialized enforcers will always be forced to modify
their enforcement practices in potentially costly ways to
achieve a similar result.
C. SPECIALIZED ENFORCEMENT AND AGENCY ALTERNATIVES
The previous two Sections have explored the structural
weaknesses that come from placing enforcement authority in a
single, specialized agency. Specialized agencies, of course, have
countervailing strengths that in many cases make up for these
weaknesses. In particular, specialist enforcement occurs in an
agency staffed by subject matter experts that also possesses
other regulatory powers. At each stage of the enforcement process, the agency can use its industry knowledge or structural
flexibility to improve, augment, or substitute for a typical enforcement action.
Consider first the decision to bring an enforcement action
in the first place. A generalist enforcer confronted with misconduct has essentially two options. It can charge conduct and
seek a penalty or it can decline to prosecute. Of course, an enforcement action might take one of many forms. For example,
the DOJ initially proceeded against some medical marijuana
facilities civilly, seeking an injunction against their ongoing operation, rather than indicting the corporation or the individu149
als. By its very nature, though, an agency that just enforces
has no other options—it can enforce or not, but it can do nothing else.
Specialist agencies, though, have options. Agencies that
decide not to enforce need not sit on their hands entirely. Most
importantly, most agencies can proceed by rulemaking. Agencies do not have to respond to misconduct by regulated entities
by seeking sanctions or imposing an order on an individual
market participant. Instead, the agency can promulgate a
broadly applicable rule that binds everyone. This ability to proceed by adjudication or rulemaking is a core structural feature
of the modern administrative agency and the discretionary nalems of interpretation and implementation. See Matthew D. Zinn, Policing
Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen
Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 154 (2002).
149. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Coop., 532 U.S. 483
(2001) (upholding such injunctive relief).
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ture of the decision is central to administrative law.
This flexibility provides specialized agencies a particular
advantage in the context of the decision not to enforce. Agencies that do not want to punish particular actions can communicate that decision in a legally binding manner. They can
alter the substantive law and commit themselves to the nonenforcement choice. By issuing a rule clarifying that certain
types of behavior are permissible, the agency will be legally
bound to follow that rule unless and until the regulation is
changed.
Generalist enforcers certainly use nonenforcement as a tool
as well. For example, the Obama Administration recently announced several areas of both civil and criminal law where it
will not enforce statutory provisions. The DOJ has indicated
that it will not bring certain categories of marijuana prosecu151
tions in states that have legalized the drug and will use its
non-enforcement authority to delay the implementation of pro152
visions of the Affordable Care Act.
Policy-based
nonenforcement is bipartisan and occurred under the Bush
153
Administration as well.
However, unlike specialized agencies with rule-making
power, a generalist enforcer cannot commit to a position.
Whenever the DOJ issues enforcement guidance, it is nonbinding. The DOJ lacks rule-making power and is free to abandon its commitment not to prosecute certain categories of cas154
es. This inability to bind can be a serious weakness. When
public actors cannot credibly commit to a course of conduct,
150. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)
(“[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad
hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”).
151. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to all
U.S. Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 13, 2013),
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/30520138291327568574
67.pdf.
152. See Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, to Insurance Commissioners
(Nov. 14, 2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Letters/
Downloads/commissioner-letter-11-14-2013.pdf. These examples are drawn
from Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND.
L. REV. 671, 673 (2014).
153. Price, supra note 152, at 674; Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation
Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 807–816 (2010) (providing
examples from the Bush Administration).
154. See Joseph Stiglitz, Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The Private Uses of Public Interest: Incentives and Institutions, J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 1998, at 9–10.
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they are unable to use policy to shape behavior past the imme155
diate present. If an agency wants to use nonenforcement to
alter conduct in the industry it regulates, it needs to commit to
it as a policy. Because generalist agencies cannot do this credibly, they will always be at a disadvantage in this realm compared to specialized agencies.
Not only can agencies modify the substantive law, they can
adjust the enforcement process itself. Consider the example of
restitution. Providing restitution for victims of misconduct is
certainly an important goal of an enforcement process. Resolving restitution claims as part of the enforcement action serves
independent enforcement values such as remorse and contri156
tion. More prosaically, it ensures that the public enforcement
action does not render a defendant judgment-proof in the face
157
of pending restitution claims.
Despite these benefits, restitution fits uneasily into the
structure of public enforcement and presents both theoretical
and practical challenges. A victim may hope that a public enforcement lawyer will seek to represent his or her interests adequately, but victims have no guarantee that the restitution
claims will be resolved to their satisfaction. A fundamental
tenant of public enforcement is that the state, not the victim, is
the prosecuting party. From the violator’s standpoint, a restitution order cannot provide one of the central goals of any defendant—a final resolution of the claims that bars relitigation
over the same injury. Because the victim is not a party, res ju158
dicata does not preclude a future lawsuit.
These problems are significant in cases involving a single
defendant and a single victim, but are amplified when an injury is caused by multiple actors or falls on multiple victims. The
former problem rose to the level of the Supreme Court in
159
Paroline v. United States. Paroline considers the scope of res155. See, e.g., id. (describing the problems arising from the inability of the
government to make credible commitments).
156. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse
and Apology Into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 89–90 (2004) (describing value of the remorse and apology in the criminal process).
157. For example, in federal prosecutions, the court cannot impose a fine
that would reduce the funds available for restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3572(b)
(2012) (“[T]he court shall impose a fine or other monetary penalty only to the
extent that such fine or penalty will not impair the ability of the defendant to
make restitution.”).
158. While the restitution order is not preclusive in its own right, the federal restitution system provides that restitution amounts can be adjusted to
reflect any later recovery of compensatory damages. See id. § 3664(j)(2).
159. 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (holding restitution was proper to the extent
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titution orders in child pornography cases. Can child victims
recover for all injuries from any defendant? Or does the federal
statute authorizing restitution in these cases limit the recovery
from each individual defendant to his or her proportional con160
tribution to the harm?
While the question in Paroline turns on a question of statutory interpretation, the core complication is the product of
generalist enforcement. Whatever the appropriate structure of
restitution, reaching the outcome in criminal litigation with a
generalist agency will be difficult, if not impossible. The optimal resolution in cases like Paroline is a binding order to pay
restitution (in some amount) directed at all of those responsible
for the creation and distribution of the child pornography. Enforcement actions, though, only reach identified violations by
known violators. The DOJ lacks the capacity to initiate an action joining the appropriate defendants in a single simultaneous action that can produce a binding restitution order. Because all it does is enforce, the optimal outcome is beyond the
reach of the generalist agency.
The problem of multiple victims raises similar issues. Administrative agencies now frequently attempt to generate pools
of money as part of enforcement process in order to compensate
victims. While this practice has a significant historical pedi161
gree, it has taken on particular importance in the last decade.
The funds generated by agencies have grown dramatically in
162
size. These funds, of course, mirror class actions in both their
goals and their overall structure. Class actions, though, come
with strong procedural protections to ensure representation of
163
the interests of absent plaintiffs. Agency restitution funds

that the defendant’s particular offense proximately caused the victim’s losses).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (“The order of restitution under this section
shall direct the defendant to pay the victim (through the appropriate court
mechanism) the full amount of the victim’s losses as determined by the
court.”).
161. Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500,
518–21 (2011) (describing the history of agency restitution efforts).
162. Id. at 527 (estimating that three agencies alone collected $10 billion in
restitution between 2001 and 2011); see also Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67
STAN. L. REV. 331, 350–59 (2014) (describing the extensive nature of the compensation provided by the SEC fair funds distributions).
163. For example, courts must investigate the adequacy of the named
plaintiffs to represent the class, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), and review and approve
any settlement before it is implemented to ensure that “it is fair, reasonable,
and adequate.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
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164

frequently lack these structural protections. From the defendant’s perspective, the preclusive consequences of these
funds are unclear. While agencies can require victims to waive
the right to sue if they decide to collect from the restitution
165
fund, absent such a waiver, defendants may be subject to
166
double recovery.
Both types of restitution efforts are essential to effective
enforcement regimes. A specialist agency with rule-making
power is far better situated to handle these efforts than a generalist “enforcement-only” agency. Rule-making is a key tool in
making these restitution efforts effective. Because the rulemaking process that can bind stakeholders beyond the defendant immediately involved in the enforcement action, it provides
administrative agencies the capacity to reach far superior resolutions in restitution actions. For absent victims, an agency can
provide the procedural protections necessary to ensure a fair
167
and adequate outcome. For absent violators, the agency can
impose restitution obligations even if they are unknown. Because a generalist enforcement agency cannot augment the enforcement process in this way, restitution will always be more
168
complex.
Finally, agencies can draw on their specialized knowledge
at the end of the enforcement process and beyond. Financial
penalties are a common outcome of public enforcement. However, they are not the only possibility. Both administrative agencies and the DOJ frequently seek and obtain remedies that are
injunctive in nature either in lieu of or in addition to financial
169
penalties. Along with injunctive relief imposed involuntarily
after litigation, entities frequently agree to implement reforms
when they settle enforcement actions. In 1982, such a consent
decree resolved the antitrust litigation brought by the DOJ
164. Zimmerman, supra note 161, at 546–47 (criticizing agency funds for
these weaknesses); see also Lemos, supra note 127, at 511 (discussing similar
issues in actions brought by state attorneys general).
165. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980) (authorizing such
waivers).
166. Zimmerman, supra note 161, at 544 (“[C]ourts lack criteria for evaluating the preclusive effect, if any, of a large agency settlement.”).
167. Id. at 563–68 (arguing for negotiated rulemaking as a mechanism to
reach the appropriate outcome).
168. Of course, the fact that a specialized agency can take these steps does
not make it inevitable that it will do so. See generally Zimmerman, supra note
161, at 539–53 (identifying the weaknesses in agency settlement funds in
practice).
169. See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 103, at 898–99 (discussing the
choice between penalties and injunctive remedies).
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against AT&T and required the divestiture of the business op170
erations providing local telephone service. More recently, the
DOJ resolved antitrust claims against Microsoft using a com171
parable consent decree. Similar outcomes are a common reso172
lution of agency enforcement actions as well.
Ensuring compliance with consent decrees is well under173
stood to be very difficult. While the court and the plaintiff
have a role in overseeing the efforts to comply, both are relatively poorly situated to monitor the behavior of the target of
the consent decree and identify violations. Even under the best
of circumstances, outsiders will struggle to understand the behavior occurring within the firm. Judges and enforcers often
lack both the time and the technical expertise to become familiar enough with the enterprise to effectively enforce consent de174
crees in a timely fashion.
As significant as these problems can be when the case is
resolved by a court-ordered consent decree, they are exacerbated when the resolution occurs without court supervision. One of
the most significant recent changes in corporate criminal prosecutions at the federal level has been the rise in the use of deferred prosecution agreements. Rather than indict a company,
federal prosecutors now routinely extract agreements from the
entity to engage in structural reform to ensure future compli175
ance. Similar in practice to a consent decree, these contractu170. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (approving
consent decree).
171. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C.
2002) (approving consent decree). These cases are not unusual. Consent decrees end the substantial majority of antitrust actions. See Jed Goldfarb, Note,
Keeping Rufo in Its Cell: The Modification of Antitrust Consent Decrees After
Rufo v. Inmates Of Suffolk County Jail, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625, 662 n.224
(1997) (collecting data on frequency of antitrust consent decrees).
172. See Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate
Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1714–20 (2007).
173. See, e.g., Eric A. Rosand, Consent Decrees in Welfare Litigation: Obstacles to Compliance, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 83, 123–34 (1994) (providing case studies on the difficulties of compliance).
174. “[M]onitoring compliance with long-term injunctions or consent decrees . . . can be a full-time job for the court.” Shira Scheindlin, We Need Help:
The Increasing Use of Special Masters in Federal Court, 58 DEPAUL L. REV.
479, 482 (2009).
175. See generally Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion To Impose Structural Reforms, in
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 36, at 62, 64–76; Richard A.
Epstein, Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the Law of
Unconstitutional Conditions, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note
36, at 38, 38–39 (comparing deferred prosecution agreements to other coercive
litigation).
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al agreements provide the government the ability to reshape
and alter the conduct of the entity in exchange for the promise
not to bring charges.
These mechanisms to resolve enforcement actions have
tremendous value, but are a clear example where specialized
enforcement agencies are likely to excel when compared to a
generalist enforcer. Ensuring compliance requires detailed
knowledge specific to a particular firm and industry. An administrative agency has the non-lawyer technical staff with the expertise to conduct these tasks. Moreover, enforcing these
agreements is quite similar to traditional agency regulation
through rulemaking but is very different from the actions that
lie at the core competency of a generalist enforcer.
In the eyes of some scholars, the weaknesses of a generalist
enforcer in setting up structural reforms are so great that these
types of agreements should be restricted solely to the use of civ176
il regulators. Certainly the use of these agreements has revealed some serious weaknesses in the approach of generalist
enforcers. For example, one common mechanism to ensure consent decrees are enforced appropriately is the appointment of a
monitor with both the time and expertise to oversee compli177
ance. However, the DOJ routinely puts in place enforcers who
178
are not industry experts but are often lawyers. As discussed
in the next Section, consultation between regulatory agencies
and generalist enforcers can alleviate some of these problems.
179
In practice, the extent of the consultation is an open question.
176. Arlen, supra note 175, at 81 (“[F]ederal civil regulators with authority
over the firm generally are in the best position to determine both whether to
impose any structural reform on a firm and, if so, which reforms should be imposed.”).
177. Griffin, supra note 36, at 119 (“About half of all DPAs also include
monitoring provisions that effectively install government representatives
within corporations to review and evaluate internal controls.”). Monitors are
also used in the civil regulatory context. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note
172, at 1722 (“[U]sing monitors is not isolated to one particular area of regulation but rather seems to be used with increasing frequency in a number of areas. Thus, the SEC, the DOJ, the IRS, and others have all used monitors.”);
Jennifer O’Hare, The Use of the Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement Actions, 1 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 89, 94–102 (2006) (describing the
role of the court-appointed corporate monitor in the SEC enforcement action
against WorldCom).
178. Griffin, supra note 36, at 120 (“In practice, however, many monitors
are former prosecutors, regulators, or retired judges. . . . Of the forty monitors
appointed since 2000, thirty are former government officials.”).
179. Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor As Regulatory Agency, in
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 36, at 177, 179–97 (describing
the effectiveness of consultation with regulators in both state and federal
prosecutions).
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Whether these critics are right, both the theory and the
practice suggest that monitoring and implementing these types
of agreements are likely to be done better by a specialized enforcer. Either as a deferred prosecution agreement without
court involvement, or as a consent decree with judicial oversight, specialists have the expertise and the capacity to make
these arrangements work. Generalist enforcers, in turn, are
more likely to struggle.
D. SPECIALIZED ENFORCEMENT AND NORMS OF BEHAVIOR
Specialized agencies bring another significant advantage to
the enforcement process. Enforcement lawyers are closer to the
agency’s industry experts. In generalist enforcement agencies,
lawyers live with lawyers. In specialist agencies, lawyers live
with other people: economists, engineers, and scientists. Agencies are largely staffed with non-lawyer subject matter experts.
Not only do agency enforcement lawyers work closely with these non-lawyers, they work closely with industry participants as
well. In regulatory agencies, the move from government to industry (and back) is common and well known. Enforcement
lawyers are frequently closely acquainted with those on the
180
other side of the revolving door.
This close contact with both government-side and industry
experts has important implications for one of the key tasks of
an enforcement agency: responding to the compliance norms
that exist within an industry. Standard theories of criminal law
compliance, such as those discussed in Part II, assume that
compliance is purely instrumental. Compliance occurs as the
181
result of the threat of punishment. However, enforcement
scholars have now broadly accepted the notion that social
norms play a key role in producing compliance with legal
182
rules. Simple notions of deterrence do not solely explain why
actors follow the law. While some comply out of fear of punishment, many others follow the rules out of a sense that it is the
183
right thing to do.
Enforcers need to respond to these compliance norms both
180. See David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U.
ILL. L. REV. 507, 547.
181. See Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the Study of Punishment, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1193–94 (2004).
182. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3–7 (1990); Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 468
(1997).
183. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 20–27 (1992).

2015]

SHOULD AGENCIES ENFORCE?

2157

substantively and procedurally. On the substantive side, enforcement actions focused on conduct that violates industry
norms can reinforce the norm and use the existence of the norm
184
to achieve compliance easily. In contrast, actions that punish
conduct that technically violates the law but is broadly viewed
as acceptable can undermine the legitimacy of both the enforcer
185
and the norm itself. While the norms themselves shape the
conduct, the actions of the enforcer can either reinforce or undermine them.
Similarly, this literature suggests that how the enforcer
conducts actions procedurally matters a great deal in reinforc186
ing norms and achieving compliance. Regardless of the substantive outcome, the response to the enforcement action depends to a large degree on how the action is handled
187
procedurally. Enforcers who are seen as consistently treating
targets fairly, with respect and without bias, build a reputation
188
for legitimacy. Legitimacy, in turn, is a key determinant in
189
whether enforcement actions generate compliance. Enforcement activity perceived as handled fairly builds the reputation
of the enforcer and produces compliance norms while the opposite is true for actions that are seen as unfair and illegitimate.
As a result, enforcers need to identify the norms that exist
in the communities they regulate, decide the quality of those
norms, and select appropriate mechanisms to modify them. At
each stage in this process—norm discovery, evaluation, and alteration—specialist agencies have an advantage. First, they are
better able to learn and understand the norms that are currently in place. Especially in complex regulatory environments,
generalist lawyers may struggle to understand the behavioral
norms that govern conduct. Industry experts are the ones best
able to figure out the norms that exist. Indeed, the DOJ has
recognized that it is likely to need help in this area. The United
184. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
186–87 (2008).
185. See id.
186. See Meares et al., supra note 181, at 1194–95 (describing this literature). Of course, this literature emphasizes the response of individuals, not
firms, to norm creation and adjustment. However, even when regulations are
aimed at firms, individuals make the ultimate compliance decisions.
187. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in
Groups, 25 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 160–62 (1992).
188. Id. at 162.
189. See Meares, supra note 181, at 1195 (“Empirical work is quite persuasive that these legitimacy factors matter more to compliance than instrumental factors, such as sanctions imposed by authorities on individuals who fail to
follow the law or private rules.”).
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States Attorneys’ Manual encourages prosecutors to consult
with industry experts in determining the adequacy of corporate
190
compliance policies. Specialized regulatory agencies already
have these experts in the building.
Second, specialists are better able to determine when the
191
norms that are in place are inadequate. A norm of noncompliance can be incredibly destructive to a system of enforcement. Tax enforcement, for example, becomes extremely difficult in a system where a significant fraction of taxpayers do not
192
comply voluntarily. In the context of safety enforcement, lax
industry norms may permit dangerous conduct to continue.
However, a lack of compliance with a rule might suggest something quite different—the regulatory requirement might be inadequate and misguided and the industry norm may produce a
safer or more appropriate outcome. Enforcement lawyers need
to be able to distinguish between situations where risky conduct is considered acceptable and adjust norms to prevent it
and, in turn, those situations where the norm is correct and the
regulation should be changed.
Finally, once norms are identified and determined to be inadequate, specialized agencies are better positioned to respond.
Punishment for noncompliance is, of course, one mechanism to
193
achieve this end and reinforce norms of compliance. As discussed in the previous section, for a generalist enforcer, punishment is the primary, if not exclusive, tool. Administrative
agencies, can take a more flexible approach, though, to alter
norms. For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has a
194
complicated and nuanced enforcement process. NRC actions
involve a multi-step process where the agency gathers input in
public forums from industry participants, including the target.
190. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 43, 9-28.800
(“Many corporations operate in complex regulatory environments outside the
normal experience of criminal prosecutors. Accordingly, prosecutors should
consult with relevant federal and state agencies with the expertise to evaluate
the adequacy of a program’s design and implementation.”).
191. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. Pa.
L. REV. 1697, 1705 (1996) (noting the possible danger of incorrect or inefficient
norms).
192. Leandra Lederman & Ted Sichelman, Enforcement As Substance in
Tax Compliance, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1679, 1740 (2013); Dan M. Kahan,
The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV.
71, 81 (2003).
193. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 182, at 470.
194. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY 24–
26 (2011), available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0934/ML093480037
.pdf.
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In addition, it frequently involves case resolutions that impose
alternative sanctions, such as naming particular employees as
engaged in misconduct even if no punishment is imposed. This
process has value in altering industry compliance norms. It is
an option for a specialist agency dedicated for a specific industry but is essentially unavailable to a generalist agency that
simply focuses on enforcement.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ENFORCEMENT
TRADEOFF
I have sought to demonstrate that we cannot assume that
agencies will enforce well solely because they are experts in
their regulatory domains. Because enforcement itself is an expertise that requires both general and specific knowledge, specialized agencies may be better or worse at enforcement compared to a generalist enforcer. In addition, the decision to lodge
enforcement authority in a specialized agency has structural
consequences, which can be either positive or negative.
How should institutional actors—Congressional, judicial,
and administrative—respond to these tradeoffs? I argue that
they attempt to maximize the strengths of specialized enforcement while reducing its weaknesses. At the initial stage, when
Congress establishes an agency, the decision to grant enforcement authority should not follow automatically as a matter of
course. For certain types of violations, federal enforcement authority should live in a generalist agency. Moreover, when Congress creates an agency with enforcement authority, that agency should specialize only to the point where the benefits
outweigh the costs, but no further.
The judiciary, in turn, should avoid assuming that all enforcement choices should receive identical deference. Agencies
vary in their enforcement capacity and judicial deference across
the enforcement choices of agencies should vary as well. Similarly, within a given agency, different decisions that now are
labeled “enforcement” should be treated differently. Decisions
that are closely tied to the agency expertise and regulatory
mission should receive significant deference, while those that
are more generalist enforcement choices should receive less.
Enforcement agencies themselves should also recognize
their relative strengths and weaknesses in making choices
about collaboration and coordination. Different enforcement
agencies can work together to use the advantages of one agency
to compensate for the shortcomings of others. While this type of
coordination now frequently happens on the level of individual
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cases, agencies need to take the next step and coordinate on the
policy level as well.
A. CONSEQUENCES FOR CONGRESS: STRUCTURING AGENCIES
For Congress, the relative value of generalist and specialist
enforcement needs to be considered when agencies are initially
established. Enforcement authority should be specialized to the
extent that the value of expertise in the subject matter overcomes the loss of general enforcement knowledge, but no further.
Where enforcement tasks are truly subject matter specific,
industry expertise may overshadow enforcement expertise. The
NRC’s enforcement of engineering safety standards in the nuclear industry is intimately intertwined with the agency’s regulatory policy choices. The agency draws heavily on internal experts with a deep knowledge of nuclear power plant
195
operations. In addition, the types of violations that occur in
the industry are fundamentally different than those pursued in
196
other enforcement environments. Placing enforcement of these standards in a generalist enforcement agency would almost
certainly be a mistake. However, even in this case, specialization has its costs. NRC enforcement has struggled with its
197
treatment of whistleblowers and with the level of influence
198
exercised by regulated entities over the enforcement process.
As discussed above, these are predictable consequences of en199
forcement specialization.
In contrast, though, other agencies enforce similar standards in closely related industries. Take, for example, the enforcement arms of the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trad195. The investigation leading to the Oyster Creek renewal discussed in
the previous section shows the extent of NRC reliance on staff experts. The
agency considered a broad range of submissions including a nearly 900 page
safety report on the operation of the plant, drawing on a wide range of staff
experts. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, SAFETY EVALUATION
REPORT
(2006),
available
at
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0623/
ML062300330.pdf.
196. Nuclear power plants are a common example of a “tightly coupled”
system where a series of small failures can interact in surprising and unexpected ways, producing catastrophic results. See CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL
ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH RISK TECHNOLOGIES 32–61 (1999) (using power plant operations as a case study of this type of system).
197. CHARLES PERROW, THE NEXT CATASTROPHE: REDUCING OUR
VULNERABILITIES TO NATURAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND TERRORIST DISASTERS 160–
63 (2007) (discussing NRC treatment of whistleblowers).
198. Id. at 168–70 (discussing capture of the enforcement function).
199. See supra Parts II.C and III.A.
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ing Commission. The SEC enforces statutes that are designed
to ensure fairness in the securities markets and prevent
200
fraud. The CFTC enforces similar statutes aimed at regulat201
ing the commodities markets and preventing fraud. These enforcement missions have similar legal foundations and are designed to serve similar purposes in protecting the markets and
202
participants.
Moreover, these markets are similar to each other but different from others. Both agencies essentially regulate the same
203
types of transactions. For example, the types of fraud that occur in the marketing of commodities and securities often look
similar. In both markets, customers can be deceived by false
claims about the future value (or the simple existence) of the
product. However, enforcement in both markets exists within a
complex regulatory scheme. SEC and CFTC enforcement actions frequently rely heavily on similar expert testimony, especially from economists, drawn from other portions of the agen204
cy.
While there are differences in the securities and commodities markets, the differences probably do not justify dividing
these enforcement tasks across these agencies. As a result, this
Article provides additional support for a commonly proposed
205
merger—joining together financial regulatory agencies. Merg206
ing the SEC and the CFTC has been frequently suggested
200. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012).
201. See Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27f (2012).
202. The similarity between the agencies’ goals is apparent in their mission
statements. Compare The Investor’s Advocate, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (June 10, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (mission is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and
facilitate capital formation”), with CFTC Mission Statement, U.S. COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/reports/strategicplan/
2015/2015strategicplan01.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) (describing its mission, which is to “protect market users and the public from fraud, manipulation, abusive practices and systemic risk related to derivatives that are subject
to the Commodity Exchange Act, and to foster open, competitive, and financially sound markets”).
203. See Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions
During and After a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 68–69 (2011)
(“The differences between [the SEC’s and CFTC’s] subject areas are merely
historical; in essence, both agencies regulate securities trading.”).
204. See Joseph W. Yockey, Choosing Governance in the FCPA Reform Debate, 38 J. CORP. L. 325, 374 (2013) (noting use of agency experts, including
economists, to supplement enforcement expertise).
205. See Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 CAL. L. REV. 327, 365 (2013) (discussing domestic and international
merger proposals).
206. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC—A Clash of
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and reached the point of a formal proposal by the Department
207
of the Treasury. The analysis above suggests that the enforcement consequences of the merger could be quite beneficial.
Revising the structure of existing agencies is a difficult
208
task, of course, but the creation of new enforcement authority
is not rare. The newly established Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is just one agency that has recently been
209
given authorization to enforce. It provides a clear example of
an agency struggling to overcome the costs of specialized enforcement. As discussed above in Part III, new enforcement
agencies are required to revisit issues that have already received significant attention in older, more generalist enforcement contexts. With respect to prosecutorial discretion, agencies need to decide which defendants to charge and which
210
defendants to let go. When agencies charge defendants, they
211
need to decide an appropriate penalty. As they conduct investigations, they need to provide appropriate incentives to in212
formants, cooperators, and whistleblowers.
To date, the CFPB has had mixed success on these fronts.
To its credit, the CFPB quickly established a policy relating to
prosecutorial discretion. In the middle of 2013, the agency
promulgated a guidance document on the factors that will af213
fect its exercise of enforcement discretion. At the highest level, these include the severity of the violation, the harm, and the
214
party’s prior conduct. Usefully, the agency has made clear
Cultures, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 537, 572 n.195, 573 (2009) (discussing proposals);
Mark Frederick Hoffman, Note, Decreasing the Costs of Jurisdictional Gridlock: Merger of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681 (1995); John D.
Benson, Comment, Ending the Turf Wars: Support For a CFTC/SEC Consolidation, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1175 (1991).
207. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED
FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 115 (2008) (discussing preparing “for a
potential merger of the CFTC and the SEC”).
208. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 10, at 1151–53 (discussing the difficulties of consolidating and restructuring existing agencies).
209. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5562 (2012) (granting the CFPB enforcement
authority).
210. See supra Part II.A.
211. See supra Part II.B.
212. See supra Part II.C.
213. See CFPB Bulletin 2013-06, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU
(June 25, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_bulletin
_responsible-conduct.pdf.
214. Id. at 1 (noting the importance of “(1) the nature, extent, and severity
of the violations identified; (2) the actual or potential harm from those violations; (3) whether there is a history of past violations; and (4) a party’s effec-
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that penalty reductions are available for what it calls “responsible conduct,” a combination of compliance-oriented responses
to violations that include identifying the violation internally,
reporting it to the government, cooperating with any investiga215
tion, and remediating any harm. These are the correct considerations for compliance efforts by violators and an early,
clear statement of their importance is the correct approach for
an enforcement agency.
Other components of the enforcement process, though, are
weaker. The CFPB policy designed to develop insider infor216
mation is brief and limited. It elicits information from members of the public including current and former employees of vi217
olators or their competitors. It does not, though, explain how
the agency will treat those insiders and others. Will they be
subject to administrative or criminal enforcement actions if
they disclose their own misconduct? Will they be protected from
218
third-party sanctions? Will the agency provide financial rewards for information? A more detailed and forthcoming policy
would provide useful guidance for those potentially motivated
to come forward.
Similarly, the CFPB has not clearly explained how it
reaches a final penalty amount. Consider the agency’s first major enforcement action against a payday lender—a November
219
2013 settlement with Cash America. Cash America agreed to
pay $5 million in penalties and $14 million in refunds. The settiveness in addressing violations”).
215. Id. (obtaining reduced penalties is possible in cases where parties
“proactively self-police for potential violations, promptly self-report to the Bureau when it identifies potential violations, quickly and completely remediate
the harm resulting from violations, and affirmatively cooperate with any Bureau investigation above and beyond what is required.”).
216. See CFPB Bulletin 2011-05 (Enforcement and Fair Lending),
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Dec. 15, 2011), http://files
.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/12/CFPB_Enforcement_Bulletin_12-15-11.pdf.
217. Id. at 1 (seeking information from “current or former employees of potential violators, contractors, vendors, and competitor companies”).
218. The policy includes generic references to statutory whistleblower protections in Dodd-Frank and the possibility of enforcement by the Secretary of
Labor. Id. However, it does not indicate whether the CFPB will use treatment
of whistleblowers as a consideration in its own enforcement actions.
219. The settlement resolved multiple alleged violations, including claims
that the payday lender engaged in robo-signing practices, violated regulations
on loans to servicemembers, and obstructed the investigation. See Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau Takes Action Against Payday Lender For RoboSigning, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Nov. 20, 2013), http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau
-takes-action-against-payday-lender-for-robo-signing.
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tlement, though, provides no justification for the penalty
220
amount. Instead, it simply indicates that it takes “into ac221
count the factors set forth” in the governing statute, “including the substantial redress provided to consumers and Re222
spondent’s cooperation . . . .” The Bureau gave no explanation
why this was a case requiring a $5 million civil penalty rather
than a $1 million, $10 million, or $50 million case.
223
As discussed above, clarity in the penalty process is especially important in the context of regulatory overlap. The CFPB
regulates entities that also face aggressive, large penalties from
other enforcement bodies. For instance, along with the SEC
and others, the CFPB jointly regulates large financial institutions, like J.P. Morgan Chase. In fact, in September 2013, the
CFPB entered into a consent decree with Chase for violations
224
relating to its credit card operations. The action was significant—Chase was required to pay a $20 million civil penalty
and provide an estimated $309 million in refunds to consum225
ers. On the same day, though, Chase also entered into a consent decree with the SEC involving activities by traders fraudu226
lently overvaluing investments to conceal losses. This action
produced a total penalty of $920 million to various regulators,
227
including a $200 million penalty to the SEC.
It is certainly unusual to see two large, simultaneous, un220. See Consent Order, Cash Am. Int’l, Inc., No. 2013-CFPB-0008 (Nov.
20, 2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201311_cfpb_
cashamerica_consent-order.pdf.
221. Id. at 14. Federal Statute, 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c) (2012), requires the Bureau to consider the size of financial resources and good faith of the person
charged, the gravity of the violation or failure to pay, the severity of the risk to
or losses of the consumer, the history of previous violations, and such other
matters as justice may require.
222. See Consent Order, supra note 220, at 14.
223. See supra Part III.B.
224. See Consent Order, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2013-CFPB0007 (Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201309_
cfpb_jpmc_consent-order.pdf.
225. CFPB Orders Chase and JPMorgan Chase To Pay $309 Million Refund for Illegal Credit Card Practices, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU
(Sept. 29, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-orders
-chase-and-jpmorgan-chase-to-pay-309-million-refund-for-illegal-credit-card
-practices/.
226. Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Exchange Act Release No. 70,458, 107 SEC Docket 4 (Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://www
.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-70458.pdf.
227. See JPMorgan Chase Agrees To Pay $200 Million and Admits Wrongdoing To Settle SEC Charges, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 19,
2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/137053981
9965.
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related enforcement actions against the same entity, but the
overall issue is common. How will the CFPB set its penalties
compared to those imposed by the SEC (and vice versa)? While
Chase clearly would prefer to avoid either penalty, it necessarily must focus on the much larger SEC action. Because the enforcement agencies are separate, though, there is no guarantee
of comparability. One option, discussed below, is agency coordination. An equally viable alternative, though, is penalty clarity.
Both agencies should explain which cases require a $200 million penalty and which cases deserve a $20 million sanction.
The CFPB is a new agency and of course it will develop a
pattern of penalties as time passes. Eventually this history will
provide guidance to the entities it regulates. In the interim,
though, we see a version of regulatory uncertainty—
enforcement uncertainty. The decision to create a new enforcement agency, rather than vest enforcement responsibility in an
existing body, inevitably creates these transition costs. Newly
created enforcement agencies need to learn lessons and develop
policies about enforcement, tasks that have already been accomplished in other agencies. These costs may be worth paying,
but Congress should not incur them casually.
B. CONSEQUENCES FOR COURTS: COMPARATIVE DEFERENCE
The comparative strengths and weaknesses of specialized
enforcement provide lessons for the courts as well. In particular, they should shape the judicial decision about setting the
level of deference to agency enforcement choices. The case law
on enforcement deference has frequently invoked two equalities. First, the Supreme Court has expressed a notion of equal
deference across enforcement agencies. If the DOJ would receive deference in a particular realm of criminal enforcement,
the Court will defer to civil administrative agencies on the
same grounds. For example, Heckler refused to closely scruti228
nize the decision not to bring an enforcement action. In doing
so, the Supreme Court explicitly compared the choice not to enforce to the decision of the executive not to indict in a criminal
case, “a decision which has long been regarded as the special
229
province of the Executive Branch.” Similarly, in Marshall v.
Jerrico, the Supreme Court accepted an administrative structure where civil enforcement agencies received a financial in230
centive from increasing civil penalty recoveries.
Because
228. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985).
229. Id. at 832.
230. Marshsall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980).
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comparable incentives did not contaminate criminal prosecu231
tions, the Court applied equal deference to civil enforcement.
Second, courts have also applied notions of equality across
different components of the enforcement process. Heckler establishes strong deference to the decision not to initiate enforcement actions. Similarly strong deference applies when an administrative agency decides to abandon an action and withdraw
232
a claim that a regulated entity violated the law. With respect
to the penalty imposed, the Court defers to the agency not only
233
234
in terms of its size, but also in terms of its timing. The
Court gives roughly equal (and strong) deference to all of these
aspects of the enforcement process.
With respect to judicial deference to agency enforcement,
the relative strengths and weaknesses of generalist and specialist enforcement suggest that both of these equalities are
misguided. Rather than equal deference, courts should look to a
model of comparative deference. Different agencies and different enforcement choices should receive different levels of deference. If deference is based on agency expertise at enforcement,
courts should treat the deference given to a generalist enforcer,
such as the Department of Justice, as the outer boundary of the
deference given to the enforcement decisions of administrative
agencies. Similarly, greater deference should be given agency
decisions that are more specialized and more closely tied to the
agency’s regulatory mission.
As an initial example, consider claims of selective prosecution. As a general matter, federal prosecutions are virtually
235
immune to these arguments. The Supreme Court has effectively limited the defense to cases where the defendant can
demonstrate that the government initiated the prosecution for
231. Id.
232. Cuyahoga Valley R.R. Co. v. Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 6 (1985); see
also Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1032–33 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (deferring to decision to settle enforcement action because decision to
settle are “judgments—arising from considerations of resource allocation,
agency priorities, and costs of alternatives—[that] are well within the agency’s
expertise and discretion”).
233. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185–86 (1973).
234. Moog Indust. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413–14 (1958) (deciding that an
order should apply immediately to a given entity is within agency discretion).
235. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996) (“Our
cases delineating the necessary elements to prove a claim of selective prosecution have taken great pains to explain that the standard is a demanding
one.”); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal justice system, the Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.”).
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constitutionally prohibited reasons, such as race or religion.
Despite its criminal law foundation, the reasons for this deference resonate strongly with administrative law doctrine. The
Supreme Court has assumed that federal prosecutors are particularly well suited (and judges are particularly poorly placed)
to engage in the tradeoffs necessary to making charging deci237
sions. As a result, the Supreme Court has assigned a “presumption of regularity” to federal indictments that is ordinarily
238
not subject to selective prosecution challenges.
The Courts of Appeals have applied a principle of equal
deference to administrative enforcement actions. These criminal law foundations rejecting selective prosecution claims have
applied with the same strength when agencies bring civil en239
forcement claims.
The arguments outlined in Part III,
though, suggest that more scrutiny is likely to be appropriate
in the administrative context. Administrative investigations
are more likely to be shaped by the process of regulatory capture. Lack of public scrutiny produces underenforcement in ordinary times, while the opposite occurs in the wake of a regulatory failure. Because specialized agency enforcement is more
subject to pressures from the political branches, more judicial
scrutiny is likely to be warranted. Selective enforcement claims
are more likely to have merit when the process of making those
charging decisions is more vulnerable.
Similarly, with respect to investigative choices, agencies
should receive at least as much review as the DOJ. The decision to provide a favorable resolution to witnesses who assist in
a prosecution receives some scrutiny now, largely through disclosure requirements. The government is required to reveal exculpatory information to the defense, including information re240
lating to benefits provided to witnesses. It is unclear whether
236. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 456 (1962).
237. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (“This broad discretion rests largely on the
recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial
review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.”).
238. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.
239. See, e.g., Martex Farms, S.E. v. EPA, 559 F.3d 29, 32–33 (1st Cir.
2009) (applying criminal law principles to reject selective prosecution arguments in EPA enforcement action); Fog Cutter Capital Grp. Inc. v. SEC, 474
F.3d 822, 826–27 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying Armstrong in SEC action); United
States v. Sage Pharm., Inc., 210 F.3d 475, 480 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying Armstrong in FDA enforcement action).
240. Criminal defendants are entitled to any information that is favorable
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these constitutional disclosure requirements extend to civil en241
forcement cases. As a matter of policy, though, they should.
To the extent that agencies provide benefits to witnesses,
courts should provide at least as much scrutiny to them as they
would in the case of a criminal prosecution.
Finally, agency settlements should receive at least as much
scrutiny as criminal plea agreements. Admittedly, the review of
plea agreements in the criminal context is limited. However, it
is still greater than the scrutiny courts give to agency enforce242
ment settlements. If agencies can be seen, on average, as less
capable at generalist enforcement functions than the DOJ, the
deference to this pure enforcement choice should also be less.
This approach would suggest that courts have the deference
calculus backwards—agency settlements need more scrutiny
than a plea bargain with comparable consequences.
To be sure, there are many other reasons for courts to defer
(or not) to enforcement choices. The specialized expertise that
enforcement agencies bring to the table is only one consideration in setting the appropriate level of scrutiny that courts
should apply. At the very least, the higher stakes in criminal
prosecutions as compared to civil regulatory enforcement
should affect the level of judicial deference. To the extent,
though, that a rule of deference is based on the specialized enforcement skill of the charging agency, specialized enforcers
and generalist enforcers should not be treated as identical. Instead, the deference to the generalist enforcer should place an
outer boundary on the deference given to other agencies.
In turn, courts should defer more to enforcement choices by
administrative agencies that are closely tied to their regulatory
mission. In many cases, actions labeled as “enforcement” decisions really are substantive regulatory decisions. For example,
243
compare the foundational cases of Butz v. Glover Livestock
244
and Moog v. Federal Trade Commission.
Butz, discussed
to the accused. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). This protection extends to information that relates to the credibility of government witnesses.
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972).
241. See Mister Disc. Stockbrokers v. SEC, 768 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir.
1985) (refusing to apply Brady in securities enforcement action); NLRB v.
Nueva Eng’g, Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 969 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding Brady unavailable in NLRB actions).
242. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires a detailed process for
accepting a guilty plea, including establishing that a factual basis for the plea
exists. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). No comparable requirement exists for most
civil enforcement settlements.
243. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’n Co., 411 U.S. 182 (1973).
244. Moog Indus. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).

2015]

SHOULD AGENCIES ENFORCE?

2169

245

above, set a strong standard of deference to agency penalty
choices. Courts will provide only very limited review of the
246
sanction imposed for administrative violations. In Moog, the
Court confronted a request to review an agency’s decision to de247
lay (or not) an order enjoining an anticompetitive practice.
The target of the order argued that the practice was widespread in the industry and sought to postpone its imposition
until other market participants were subject to the same re248
quirement. The Court rejected this argument and deferred to
249
the agency decision.
In light of the discussion in Part III, Moog is likely correct.
The decision to impose a requirement on only one entity or the
entire market is not a mere generalist enforcement choice. It is
deeply intertwined with the agency’s specialized mission. At
the core, it is a decision whether to engage in policymaking by
250
rule or adjudication. As a result, deference to the agency decision is appropriate here. The decision draws on specialized
agency knowledge, not broad “enforcement” capabilities.
In contrast, the deference to penalty choices is more complex. The order at issue in Butz itself was effectively injunctive
in nature—the agency imposed a cease-and-desist order on the
violator, required him to keep accurate records, and suspended
251
him from the industry for a brief period. This decision fits
naturally in the type of remedy where we should expect specialized agencies to shine. It draws on industry expertise, not generic enforcement knowledge.
That deference, though, has not been limited to orders that
are injunctive in nature. Numerous courts of appeals have ex252
tended Butz to civil penalties. This decision is much more difficult to defend. Penalty calculation involves significant generalist enforcement expertise. Specialized, industry-specific
knowledge matters far less when the sanction is the equivalent
253
of a fine rather than a compliance order. As a result, courts
245. See supra Section I.A.
246. Butz, 411 U.S. at 185–87.
247. 355 U.S. at 413.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
251. 411 U.S. at 184.
252. See, e.g., VanCook v. SEC, 653 F.3d 130, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying Butz to SEC penalty); Vidiksis v. EPA, 612 F.3d 1150, 1154 (11th Cir.
2010) (EPA penalty); Sultan Chemists, Inc. v. EPA, 281 F.3d 73, 83 (3d Cir.
2002) (same).
253. See supra Section III.C.
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should defer less when the sanction is monetary.
None of this analysis answers the ultimate question about
the absolute level of judicial discretion in the enforcement context. Others have certainly argued persuasively that Heckler,
254
for example, sets the bar of judicial review too low. This may
well be correct—understanding that specialized enforcement
has strengths and weaknesses compared to generalist enforcers
does not identify the right level of deference to agency enforcement decisions in the abstract. Nor does it predict the appropriate level of deference to enforcement choices compared to
other agency decisions. Instead, it suggests the appropriate relative level of deference within the universe of enforcement
choices. Enforcement choices made by specialized agencies
within their area of expertise should receive more deference
than choices by those same agencies that require enforcement
knowledge more generally. Similarly, for enforcement choices
that are outside that realm and are more general in nature,
courts should defer less to agencies than to a generalist enforcer.
C. CONSEQUENCES FOR AGENCIES: COLLABORATIVE
ENFORCEMENT
Perhaps the most important normative response to the
current structure of agency enforcement is the most straightforward. Enforcers need to collaborate and coordinate enforcement actions. Other scholars have strongly advocated for coor255
dination of enforcement functions in specific contexts. The
costs and benefits outlined in the sections above support and
254. Soon after Heckler came down, Cass Sunstein advocated for permitting challenges to nonenforcement decisions based on certain identified
grounds: constitutionally impermissible factors; absence of jurisdiction; statutorily irrelevant factors; patterns of nonenforcement; refusals to enforce; and
failures to initiate rulemakings. Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction
After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 675–83 (1985). More recent
critiques have proposed even more searching review of inaction. See Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 182 (1996) (arguing for a Chenery-style review requiring an agency to state its reasons); Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1686 (2004) (advocating arbitrariness review);
Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY L.J. 369, 372
(2009) (advocating for an administrative agency response).
255. See, e.g., Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow, Conclusion, in
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 36, at 249, 250–52 (emphasizing
the value of cross-enforcer coordination in the deferred prosecution context);
Zimmerman, supra note 161, at 556–57 (noting that agency enforcement actions should be responsive to private class action litigations); Id. at 557 n.283
(identifying others making similar arguments).
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extend these recommendations. The relative weaknesses of
specialized and generalist enforcers can be largely eliminated
when paired with the corresponding strengths of their counterparts.
At the charging stage, joint enforcement actions between
enforcement agencies can leverage the expertise of the generalist enforcer in allocating responsibility between individuals and
corporations. It also takes advantage of the industry expertise
of the specialist. By ensuring that specialized enforcers have
input at the charging stage, all enforcement agencies can avoid
undermining valuable industry norms of compliance. Similarly,
expert agency input can help target enforcement actions in areas where those norms need to be strengthened.
Joint resolutions have similar benefits. A global resolution
by multiple enforcers can reduce or eliminate the silo effect described above. By simultaneously concluding charges brought
by multiple agencies, the incentives of the target of the enforcement action and the public enforcers are brought into
alignment. Consequences that would otherwise be collateral to
the action become direct and, as a result, are subject to negotiation between the defendant and the agencies. Similarly, the
problems of scaling penalties are reduced. If all enforcers obtain their penalties simultaneously, they are far more likely to
be set in coordination with one another. Finally, if a specialist
agency is involved in the resolution of the enforcement action,
it will have the opportunity to participate in any settlement requiring ongoing monitoring. As discussed above, there are
strong reasons to believe that specialist agencies are much better positioned to monitor ongoing conduct than a generalist enforcer.
Despite these benefits, enforcement coordination is far
from inevitable. As the Supreme Court has recognized, public
256
enforcement can be competitive. Federal agencies compete
horizontally for enforcement targets—most famously, the SEC
257
and the CFTC have had jurisdictional clashes. Federal and
state agencies compete vertically as they chase similar enforcement actions. This competition is especially fierce when

256. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (justifying magistrate’s involvement in the probable cause process given “the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime”).
257. See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 103, at 902 (discussing the difference between horizontal and vertical enforcement and collecting sources on
SEC/CFTC competition).
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258

the dollars involved are large.
In practice, enforcement coordination does occur and is frequently successful. Major enforcement actions now often involve simultaneous resolution by multiple agencies. As one example, the September 2013 fraud settlement described above
led to not only a $200 million civil penalty for the SEC, but a
total of $920 million in penalties to federal and international
259
regulators. These case-by-case collaborations are increasingly
260
common and extremely valuable.
Enforcement agencies, though, are less likely to take the
important second step and collaborate across enforcement regimes. Collaboration mostly happens in individual actions and
261
on an ad hoc basis. Equally important, though, agencies need
to coordinate at the policy level. Return again to the example of
penalty calculation. Penalty coordination is extremely important in individual cases, but conveying the appropriate message to regulated entities requires more. Systems of penalties
need coordination as well. However, for many agencies, this
level of cross-agency communication is impossible, because they
have not taken the first step of clearly identifying their method
for calculating penalties in the agency itself. External coordination cannot precede internal coordination.
Similar questions arise with cooperators, informants, and
whistleblowers. To the extent that potential cooperators provide information disclosing their own misconduct, they need to
know how that disclosure will affect liability in all enforcement
regimes, not merely the one maintained by the agency first receiving the information. As is true with penalty calculations,
though, agencies that have not yet reached an internal decision
how to handle cooperators cannot engage in cross-agency col262
laboration on their treatment.
258. Id. (describing the effect of financial incentives on enforcement competition).
259. See supra note 227. The other regulators involved were the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority, the Federal Reserve, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Id.
260. Brandon L. Garrett, Collaborative Organizational Prosecution, in
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 36, at 154, 155 (“[P]rosecutors
and regulators collaborate in joint adjudication. What has been little recognized is that many federal organizational prosecution agreements were negotiated jointly with regulatory agencies.”).
261. Id. (noting the problem and arguing for greater policy coordination
across agencies).
262. In some cases, agencies have tried to coordinate their whistleblower
programs. For example, the SEC and the CFTC have made significant efforts
to make the programs comparable. Of course, defense counsel have quickly
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Finally, enforcement regimes should not just be coordinat263
ed with each other enforcement regime. As described above,
one of the key advantages of specialized agency enforcement is
the availability of other agency tools to achieve regulatory
goals, either instead of or in addition to enforcement actions.
Regulatory agencies need to use these tools respond to the
problems identified by enforcement actions, either the agency’s
own investigations or those brought by a generalist enforcer
like the DOJ. Through substantive law promulgated in rules,
the specialist agency can respond to enforcement problems with
non-enforcement solutions.
CONCLUSION
Should agencies enforce? Certainly. Agency enforcement
authority is not just desirable, it is now inevitable. This Article
demonstrates, though, that it is not an unmixed blessing. Specialized enforcement produces costs along with its benefits. Effective enforcement in complicated industries requires mastery
of two areas. Agencies must develop both generalist enforcement capacity and industry-specific knowledge. Specialized
agencies start with an advantage in the second step, but at the
expense of the first. Agencies also bring structural strengths
and weaknesses to the enforcement process. Regulatory capture
of the enforcement process becomes more serious as the agency
focus narrows. Furthermore, specialized agencies lack the capacity to see enforcement actions through the eyes of the target. They compensate, though, with a greater knowledge of the
industry norms and by bringing other components of the administrative process to bear on violations. Institutional actors—Congress, the courts, and agencies themselves—need to
consider these strengths and weaknesses as they respond to
and shape the agency enforcement process.

identified and focused on the gaps between the programs. See, e.g., Thomas W.
White et al., CFTC and SEC Whistleblower Bounties: Largely Similar but Important Differences Remain, WILMERHALE (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www
.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=94288.
263. See supra Section III.C.

